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Abstract
We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual
choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all prop-
erties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties
he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two
kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary
across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options,
but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly
rational and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in
new ways, it also o↵ers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts.
Keywords: Rational choice, reasons, context-dependence, bounded and
sophisticated rationality, prediction of choice.
1 Introduction
How can we explain an agent’s choices? The classical theory of rational choice does so
by ascribing to the agent a preference relation over the options – in the simplest case, an
ordering. This preference relation explains the agent’s choices if, in every choice context,
the agent chooses the most preferred option among the feasible ones.1 The choices are
then said to be rationalized by the preference relation. When choices involve uncertainty,
we must ascribe beliefs as well as preferences to the agent, such that the agent always
⇤Contact details: F. Dietrich, Paris School of Economics & CNRS, CES-Centre d’Economie de la
Sorbonne, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital, 75647 Paris cedex 13,
France; URL: <http://www.franzdietrich.net>. C. List, London School of Economics, Departments of
Government and Philosophy, London WC2A 2AE, U.K.; URL: <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST>.
1Or, if there is no unique most preferred option, he or she chooses one that is tied for most preferred.
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chooses an expectation-maximizing option, but the logic of the explanation is similar.
Though elegant and influential, this theory has some well-known problems:
An empirical problem: It cannot accommodate all empirically documented patterns
of choices. As psychologists and behavioural economists have amply shown, people often
choose in ways that cannot be naturally rationalized by any preference relation over the
options. For example, people are susceptible to framing e↵ects, often satisfice rather than
optimize, and follow social norms that are not in line with the constraints of classical
rational choice theory (e.g., Camerer et al. 2004). We give some illustrations later.
An explanatory problem: Even when there is a preference relation over the op-
tions that rationalizes an agent’s choices, it is far from clear whether this can be viewed
as a genuine explanation of those choices. For a start, many economists adopt a be-
haviouristic interpretation of preferences and treat preference relations merely as formal
representations of choices and not as genuinely explanatory. But aside from this concern,
when we are asked, “why did you choose teaching rather than banking as your career”,
simply saying “because I preferred one to the other” is not very illuminating. We are
expected to give reasons for our choices, as philosophers and psychologists have long
emphasized (e.g., Shafir et al. 1993; Lenman 2011). A better explanation might be that
we perceive teaching as a way of making a social contribution and promoting learning,
while we perceive banking as a way of making money and supporting the economy’s
status quo; and we rank the first bundle of properties more highly than the second.
A predictive problem: A less widely recognized problem is that the classical theory
is limited in its ability to predict an agent’s future choices (see Bermudez 2009). If we
simply ascribe a preference relation to the agent, based on his or her past choices, then
we can predict future choices only in special cases: namely when this preference relation
already ranks the options involved. This is only the case when these options are ones the
agent has encountered before, unless we can somehow extrapolate the agent’s preferences
to them. When the options are genuinely new, such an extrapolation is di cult. This
limitation is a byproduct of the parsimonious informational basis of classical choice
theory.
We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining individual choices, which
is intended to overcome all of these problems. It is prompted by our diagnosis of a key
shortcoming of the classical theory: the lack of an account of how agents perceive the
options they are faced with. In the classical theory, options are usually primitives, which
2
are not further unpacked, and agents have preferences over them. In reality, however,
each option has numerous properties, and an agent focuses only on some, but not all, of
these properties in making his or her choices. Recall the example of teaching versus bank-
ing. An agent might perceive the first option as the property bundle “contributing to
society and promoting learning” and the second as the property bundle “making money
and supporting the economy’s status quo”. Our framework captures the idea that agents
perceive the options in terms of “motivationally salient” properties. Choices are then
made, not based on fixed preferences over options, but based on more fundamental pref-
erences over motivationally salient property bundles (cf. Lancaster 1966,Gorman 1980).
We lift two common but problematic assumptions. One is that the agents whose
choices we seek to explain perceive the options in the same way as we, the modellers, do.
In our framework, we can express di↵erent hypotheses about how an agent perceives the
options, and ask what choice behaviours these hypotheses would predict. A second as-
sumption which we lift is that an agent will always perceive the same options in the same
way, irrespective of the choice context. In our framework, an agent’s perception of the
options may depend on the context in two ways. First, the motivationally salient prop-
erties may vary from context to context. We call this phenomenon “context-variance”.
It arguably plays a role in framing e↵ects. Second, the motivationally salient properties
may go beyond “intrinsic” properties of the options and may include “context-related”
properties. Examples are whether an option conforms to a context-specific social norm
(e.g., is it polite in that context?), whether it is above average quality among the avail-
able options, or whether the choice menu o↵ers luxury options. We call this phenomenon
“context-relatedness”. It arguably plays a role in certain sophisticated choice behaviours,
such as non-consequentialist or norm-following behaviours.
The move from options as primitives to options that are perceived as bundles of
properties also yields new resources for predicting an agent’s future choices: properties
can be recombined in new ways, and an agent’s attitudes towards certain property
instantiations in the past can give us evidence for his or her attitudes towards new
instantiations of those properties.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the classical theory of ratio-
nal choice, our point of departure. In Section 3, we informally describe our framework,
followed by a more formal exposition in Section 4. In Section 5, we characterize all
choice functions that can be explained in a reason-based way. In Section 6, we discuss
some applications. In Section 7, we turn to the prediction of choices in novel contexts.
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1.1 Related literature
This paper contributes to the literature on models of individual choice and especially
the rationalization of choice functions. For a comprehensive overview of rationalization
theory, see Bossert and Suzumura (2010). There are, by now, many papers which propose
non-classical models of individual choice, prompted by the shortcomings of classical
rational choice theory (see, among others, Sen 1993; Suzumura and Xu 2001; Kalai
et al. 2002; Gaertner and Xu 2004; Manzini and Mariotti 2007, 2012; Mandler et al.
2012; and Cherepanov et al. 2013). However, none of these works explain choices in
the “reason-based” way developed here, nor in terms of the two orthogonal kinds of
context-dependence we identify.2
In economics, the closest precursors to the present paper are perhaps two pairs
of papers by Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009), and by
Bossert and Suzumura (2009) and Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, andXu (2011). As we dis-
cuss later, they each cover one of our two kinds of context-dependent choice. An impor-
tant precursor in psychology is Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky’s work on “reason-based
choice” (1993). They proposed that “when faced with the need to choose, decision makers
often seek and construct reasons in order to resolve the conflict and justify their choice”
(p. 11). Our paper can be viewed as a formalization of this reason-based approach.
There are also several related works on property-based preferences, the logic of prefer-
ences, and preference change. In consumer theory, Lancaster (1966) and Gorman (1980)
developed the idea that an agent’s preferences over consumption goods depend on their
characteristics. In philosophy, von Wright (1963) studied the logic of preferences, still
influencing current work (e.g., Liu 2010); and Pettit (1991) and de Jongh and Liu (2009)
discussed the dependence of an agent’s preferences on properties of the options.
In our own previous work, we developed a model of how reasons, or motivationally
salient properties, relate to preferences, and used this model to study preference change
(Dietrich and List 2011, 2013a, 2013b). Osherson and Weinstein (2012) proposed a
formal logic of preferences based on reasons. Unlike these earlier papers, the present
paper (i) focuses on the explanation of choice, not preference, (ii) treats motivationally
salient properties, not as exogenously given, but as endogenously determined by the
choice context, and (iii) considers not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also
properties related to the choice context.
2Similarities to our reason-based approach can be found in Rubinstein’s (2006) distinction between
“internal” and “external” reasons for choice, in Manzini, Mariotti, and Mandler’s use of properties in
checklists (as discussed later), and in the notions of “attention” or “consideration sets”, as typically
discussed in relation to options rather than properties (e.g., Masatlioglu et al. 2012).
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2 The classical theory of rational choice
2.1 The basics
We begin by reviewing the basics of classical rational choice theory. The central concept
is that of an agent’s choice function. This assigns, to each choice context, the option(s)
chosen by the agent in that context. The aim is to explain or “rationalize” a given
choice function by ascribing to the agent a preference relation over the options. This
“rationalization” is successful if, in each choice context, the agent chooses the most
preferred option(s) in that context, according to the given preference relation.
It is natural to view the choice function as the explanandum – the observable object
that we seek to explain – and the preference relation as the explanans – the theoretical
object that does the explaining. However, as noted in the introduction, many choice
theorists avoid using the language of “explanation”, because they interpret the pref-
erence relation behaviouristically, as a mere representation of the choice function: a
convenient way to express its informational content. Elsewhere, we have argued against
this behaviouristic interpretation (Dietrich and List 2012).
Formally, the observable primitives of the classical theory are the following:
• A non-empty set X of options. Typical elements are x, y, z, ...
• A non-empty set K of contexts (sometimes called “menus”), where each element
K 2 K is a non-empty set K ✓ X of feasible options. In the simplest case, K is
the set of all non-empty subsets of X.
• A choice function C : K! 2X , which assigns to each context K 2 K a non-empty
set of “chosen options” in K (i.e., C(K) ✓ K). If the chosen set C(K) contains
more than one option, this means that several options are tied for choice.
The choice function C is rationalizable by a preference relation if there exists a binary
relation % on X such that, for all contexts K 2 K,
C(K) = {x 2 K : x % y for all y 2 K}.
A simple example illustrates these definitions. Here, the set X consists of an apple, a
banana, and a coconut; the set K consists of all non-empty subsets of X; and the choice
function C is as follows:
• C({apple, banana, coconut}) = {apple};
• C({apple, banana}) = {apple};
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• C({apple, coconut}) = {apple};
• C({banana, coconut}) = {banana};
• C({apple}) = {apple};
• C({banana}) = {banana};
• C({coconut}) = {coconut}.
This choice function can be rationalized by a (complete and transitive) preference relation
% which satisfies
apple   banana   coconut.
As is standard,   is the strict part of %, and ⇠ is the indi↵erence part.
2.2 When is a choice function rationalizable by a preference relation?
Not all logically possible choice functions can be rationalized by a preference relation.
For instance, if an agent chooses an apple from the set {apple, banana, coconut} and a
banana from the set {apple, banana}, then no preference relation will rationalize this pat-
tern of choices. To be consistent with the first choice, i.e., C({apple, banana, coconut}) =
{apple}, the preference relation would have to rank the apple at least weakly above all
three fruits. But then the apple would also have to be chosen from the set {apple, banana},
which contradicts the second choice, i.e., C({apple, banana}) = {banana}.
From the perspective of scientific method, the fact that not all choice functions can
be rationalized by a preference relation is good news. It means that the hypothesis that
an agent’s choices are based on a preference relation is falsifiable; it is not a tautology (at
least once the set of options has been fixed). The following classic result gives necessary
and su cient conditions for a choice function to be rationalizable by a preference relation.
Proposition 1 (Richter 1971) A choice function C is rationalizable by a preference
relation if and only if it satisfies the axiom of Revelation Coherence.
To state that axiom, let us say that an option x is chosen weakly over an option y
in context K if x, y 2 K and x 2 C(K). Further, x is chosen strictly over y in K if, in
addition, y /2 C(K).
Revelation Coherence For all contexts K 2 K and any feasible option x 2 K, if, for
every option y 2 K, there is a context K 0 2 K in which x is chosen weakly over y, then
x 2 C(K).
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Revelation Coherence does not guarantee that the binary relation that rationalizes
a given choice function satisfies any further properties such as acyclicity or transitivity.
For that, the choice function must satisfy stronger conditions, such as the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference (e.g., Samuelson 1948; Bossert and Suzumura 2010). The details
need not concern us here. What matters for our purposes is a general point: if, and
only if, a choice function satisfies certain structural conditions, it can be rationalized by
a preference relation.
2.3 Bounded versus sophisticated rationality
There are at least two familiar kinds of choice behaviours which conflict with the struc-
tural conditions just mentioned and which the classical theory therefore cannot accom-
modate – at least not without significant adjustments.
Cases of bounded rationality: As is empirically well established, human decision-
makers often violate conditions such as Revelation Coherence or the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference due to framing e↵ects, menu-dependent choice, susceptibility to
nudges, the use of heuristics, unawareness, and other psychological phenomena. For
example, a mere redescription of the options can lead to choice reversals. In Tversky
and Kahneman’s framing experiments (e.g., 1981), participants reversed their choices
over the same pair of options when their description was slightly modified, even though
the experimenters were careful not to change any information conveyed. Similarly, policy
makers are well aware that subtle changes in the decision environment, such as a change
from an “opt-out” to an “opt-in” default in an insurance scheme, can greatly a↵ect
people’s choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Decision-makers also often satisfice rather
than optimize or use simple heuristics (Gigerenzer et al. 2000). An example is someone
whose rule of thumb for buying a banana is to choose one whose size is above the average
of the batch on o↵er. None of these choices can be rationalized by a preference relation
over the options, unless we redescribe the options in a complicated way.
Cases of sophisticated rationality: The structural conditions of the classical theory
also fail to accommodate some intuitively rational but sophisticated forms of choice, such
as choices based on norm-following or non-consequentialism. For example, a dinner-party
guest who never chooses the largest piece of cake o↵ered to him or her for politeness and
instead chooses the second largest cannot be rationalized by a preference relation over
pieces of cake (Sen 1993). The classical theory deems this choice behaviour “irrational”,
on a par with an ordinary rationality violation. Similarly, consider a professor who votes
7
for a university reform when the dean and president have respected the relevant proce-
dures in the run-up to the vote, but votes against it when there has been a procedural
breach. Assume that the reform and its consequences would be the same in both cases.
If the options are “reform” and “no reform”, we cannot rationalize this choice behaviour
by a preference relation. To accommodate it, we would, at least, have to “re-individuate”
the options by building some features of the choice context into them.
We suggest that the classical theory’s di culty in handling these cases, and its in-
ability to distinguish bounded from sophisticated rationality, stems from the lack of a
model of how agents perceive the options in any given choice context. When we provide
such a model, a unified explanation of many of the challenging phenomena can be given.
3 Our framework, informally explained
3.1 The idea of a reason-based explanation of choice
Our basic idea is the following. When an agent chooses between several options in
some context, e.g., yoghurts in a supermarket, he or she perceives each option not as a
primitive object, but as a bundle of properties. Although each option can have many
properties, the agent considers not all of them, but only a subset: the motivationally
salient properties. In the supermarket, these may include whether the yoghurt is fruit-
flavoured, low-fat, and free from artificial sweeteners, but exclude whether the yoghurt
has an odd (as opposed to even) number of letters on its label (an irrelevant property)
and whether it has been sustainably produced (a property ignored by many consumers).
The agent then makes his or her choice on the basis of a fundamental preference relation
over property bundles. He chooses one option over another in the given context, e.g.,
a low-fat cherry yoghurt over a full-fat, sugar-free vanilla yoghurt, if and only if his
fundamental preference relation ranks the set of motivationally salient properties of the
first option, say {low-fat, fruit-flavoured}, above the set of the second, say {full-fat,
vanilla-flavoured, artificially sweetened}.
We call an agent’s choice behaviour reason-based explicable if it can be explained in
this way. More precisely, a reason-based explanation attributes two things to an agent:
• amotivational salience function, which assigns to each choice context the properties
that the agent cares about in that context: the “motivationally salient” properties;
and
• a fundamental preference relation over bundles of properties.
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We call the pair consisting of a motivational salience function and a fundamental pref-
erence relation a reasons structure. According to a reason-based explanation, the agent
perceives the options in each context through the lens of the motivationally salient
properties in that context; and the agent then chooses an option whose bundle of moti-
vationally salient properties he or she most prefers.
Later, we axiomatically characterize all choice functions that admit a reason-based
explanation. Technically, reason-based explanation is a new rationalization concept.
But given our emphasis on the idea of explaining choices, we use the term “explanation”
rather than “rationalization”.
3.2 How the context matters
In our framework, the motivationally salient properties that occur in a reasons structure
may be of up to three kinds:
• option properties, which options have independently of the choice context and
which are thus “intrinsic” to the options;
• relational properties, which options have relative to the context; and
• context properties, which are properties of the context alone.
Examples of option properties are “fruit-flavoured” and “low-fat” (in yoghurts); these
depend solely on the yoghurt itself. Examples of relational properties are whether a
yoghurt is the only cherry yoghurt on display, or the cheapest; these depend also on
the other available yoghurts. Examples of context properties are whether the available
yoghurts include premium brands (this depends only on the menu) and whether there is
background music (this depends on features of the context over and above the menu).
Reason-based explanations can capture two kinds of context-dependent motivation:
Context-variance: Here, the context a↵ects which properties are motivationally salient,
so that the agent cares about di↵erent properties in di↵erent contexts. For example, some
contexts make the agent diet-conscious, others not.
Context-relatedness: Here, the motivationally salient properties in some contexts go
beyond option properties and include relational or context properties, so that the agent
cares about the context or about how the options relate to it. For example, the agent
cares about whether the choice of an option is polite in the given context, whether it is
bigger than average, or whether there are luxury options available.
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Many non-classical forms of choice can be subsumed under these two kinds of context-
dependence. Arguably, bounded rationality, such as susceptibility to framing and nudg-
ing, often involves context-variant motivation. Sophisticated rationality, such as norm-
following or non-consequentialism, often involves context-related motivation. By con-
trast, classically rational choice excludes both kinds of context-dependence. Of course,
we do not claim that context-variance is always boundedly rational or that context-
relatedness is always sophisticated. The key point is that reason-based explanations can
be given for a variety of choice behaviours that cannot be rationalized by a preference
relation in the classical way.
3.3 A common objection
Before we present our framework formally, it is worth addressing one common objection.
Since we take agents to perceive options as bundles of motivationally salient properties,
a critic might ask why we do not simply define each option as a bundle of motivationally
salient properties. Should we not define the set X as the set of all such bundles? A
choice context would then be a set of property bundles among which the agent can
choose. Everything else would remain classical.
There are, however, three problems that this proposal would fail to address (see
Bhattacharyya et al. 2011 for some similar observations):
• First, we, the modellers, do not know in advance how the agent will perceive each
option in a given context. The motivationally salient properties can be inferred,
at most, after observing the agent’s choice behaviour.
• Second, an agent may perceive the same option through the lens of di↵erent prop-
erties in di↵erent contexts, for instance when certain properties are motivationally
salient in some contexts but not in others. This second problem, together with
the first, illustrates that, while we may treat options as observable primitives, we
cannot equally treat an option’s motivationally salient properties as an observable
primitive. The notion of motivational salience is invoked in our explanation of the
agent’s choices; it is not part of our pre-theoretic description of those choices.
• Third, the same option can have di↵erent properties in di↵erent contexts when
these properties are relational. For instance, the same piece of cake can be the
second-largest in one context and the largest in another, and thus “politely choos-
able” in the former context, but not in the latter. If we were to speak of two
distinct pieces of cake here, we would no longer capture the fact that there is a
perfectly intelligible sense in which they are the same, albeit in di↵erent contexts.
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To address these problems, we must have a way of distinguishing between an option in
the “objective” sense, as viewed from the “Olympian” perspective of the modeller, and
an option in the “subjective” sense, as perceived by the agent whose choice behaviour
we seek to explain. Our framework allows us to draw this distinction. We can think of
each element of the original set X as an option in the “objective” sense. And we can
think of each option’s bundle of motivationally salient properties in a given context as
the option in the “subjective” sense, as perceived by the agent.
4 Our framework, formally defined
4.1 Observable primitives
We are now in a position to present our framework formally. The observable primitives
are exactly the same as in the classical theory. As before, we have a non-empty set
X of options; a non-empty set K of contexts, each of which o↵ers a non-empty set of
feasible options (a subset of X); and a choice function C : K ! 2X , which assigns to
each context K 2 K a non-empty set of chosen options among the feasible ones in K.
We permit only one small generalization, which is, however, optional. Readers who
do not like this generalization may ignore it; all our results also hold without it. We do
not require that each context be identified with its set of feasible options. Instead, we
merely require that it induce a set of feasible options. Thus a context K 2 K need not
be a subset K ✓ X; it must merely pick out such a subset. This permits (but of course
does not require) the existence of distinct contexts that o↵er the same options.
Specifically, each context K could be a pair (Y, ), where Y is the feasible set (with
Y ✓ X) and   is a parameter that specifies some further features of the environment (as
in the notion of a “frame” or “ancillary condition”, as defined in Salant and Rubinstein
2008 and Bernheim and Rangel 2009; see Section 6.4 below). This parameter could
represent a cue given to the agent, a specification of a “default” option, some priming
before the choice, the cultural environment, some background music, or the room tem-
perature – even a state of the agent such as “sober” or “drunk”. We might distinguish,
for instance, between a supermarket with classical music in the background and the same
supermarket with pop music, where there is no di↵erence in the goods on o↵er.
O cially, we write K for the context under our general definition, and [K] for its
feasible set, so that [K] is a subset of X, while K need not be. For convenience, we often
drop the square brackets and write K for [K], since it is usually unambiguous whether
K refers to the context itself or to the feasible set [K]. For example, in the expression
“x 2 K”, K refers to [K].
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4.2 Properties
Our next step is to define properties. At first, we might be tempted to define a property
simply as a feature that an option may or may not have, so that each property picks out
a subset of X consisting of those options that have the property. The property “being
a fat-free yoghurt” can be modelled like this. If X is the set of all possible goods in a
supermarket, this property can be identified with the subset of X consisting of all fat-
free yoghurts. However, this definition of properties is insu ciently general. As already
noted, we want to allow for the possibility that an agent’s choices may be driven by
properties that relate to the choice context.
We therefore define properties as features of option-context pairs, i.e., as features
of pairs of the form (x,K), where x is an option and K is a choice context. Formally,
a property is an abstract object, P , that picks out a subset [P ] ✓ X ⇥ K called its
extension, consisting of all option-context pairs that “have” or “satisfy” the property
(thus properties are binary here). Note that X ⇥ K is the set of all option-context
pairs.3 We assume that the extension of any property is distinct from ? (the empty set)
and from X ⇥K (the universal set). This rules out properties that are never satisfied or
always satisfied.
Our definition allows distinct properties to have the same extension. This is use-
ful for capturing framing e↵ects in which the description of a property matters. For
example, the properties “80% fat-free” and “20% fat” (in foods) have the same exten-
sion but di↵erent descriptions and may sometimes prompt di↵erent responses. In many
applications, however, it su ces to identify properties with their extensions.
We can now formalize the distinction between option properties, context properties,
and relational properties.
Option properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair
depends only on the option, not on the context; they are in this sense “intrinsic” to the
option. Examples are “fat-free” and “vanilla-flavoured” (in yoghurts). Formally, P is an
option property if
(x,K) 2 [P ], (x,K 0) 2 [P ] for all x 2 X and K,K 0 2 K.
Context properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair
depends only on the context, not on the option. Examples are “o↵ering more than one
feasible option”, “o↵ering a Rolls Royce among the feasible options”, and – if contexts
3Some pairs (x,K) in X ⇥K are “infeasible” in the sense that x /2 K.
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specify the choice environment over and above the feasible set – the time (“it’s evening”),
the temperature (“it’s a hot day”), or a default (“the status quo is such-and-such”).
Formally, P is a context property if
(x,K) 2 [P ], (x0,K) 2 [P ] for all x, x0 2 X and K 2 K.
Relational properties: These are properties whose possesion by an option-context
pair depends on both the option and the context. Examples are “not being the largest
piece of cake o↵ered” and “being the most expensive car on the market”. Formally, P
is a relational property if it is neither an option property nor a context property.
We call properties that are not option properties context-related and properties that
are not context properties option-related. Relational properties are context-related and
option-related.
4.3 An example
To illustrate how properties can a↵ect choices, we give an example to which we will refer
repeatedly. We introduce this example in a pre-theoretic way, and only later show how
it can be explained in our framework. The example concerns the choice of fruit at a
dinner party, as in Sen’s well-known story of a polite dinner-party guest (Sen 1993).
LetX contain di↵erent fruits: apples, bananas, chocolate-covered pears, and possibly
others. Each kind of fruit comes in up to three sizes: big, medium, and small. A choice
context is a non-empty feasible set K ✓ X, consisting of fruits currently in the basket
(so, in this example, we require only the classical notion of a context). The set of possible
contexts is K = 2X\{?}. We consider the following properties:
• “big”, “medium”, and “small”: the option properties of being a big, medium, and
small fruit, respectively;
• “chocolate-o↵ering”: the context property of o↵ering at least one chocolate-covered
fruit among the feasible options;
• “polite”: the relational property of not being the last available fruit of its kind,
i.e., not being the last apple in the basket, the last banana, and so on.
We describe four agents whose choice behaviour we will later explain:
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Bon-vivant Bonnie always chooses a largest available fruit. For any K, she chooses
C(K) = {x 2 K : x is largest in K},
where “medium” is larger than “small”, and “big” is larger than both other sizes.
Polite Pauline politely avoids choosing the last available fruit of its kind and only
secondarily cares about a fruit’s size. For any K, she chooses
C(K) = {x 2 K : x is largest in K⇤ if K⇤ 6= ? and largest in K if K⇤ = ?},
where K⇤ is the set of all fruits in K that are not the last available ones of their kind.
Chocoholic Coco picks any fruit indi↵erently when no chocolate-covered fruit is avail-
able, but otherwise chooses a largest available fruit, because the smell of chocolate makes
him hungry. For any K, he chooses
C(K) =
(
K if Kcontains no chocolate-covered fruit,
{x 2 K : x is largest in K} otherwise.
Weak-willed William makes the same polite choices as Pauline when no chocolate-
covered fruit is available, and the same “greedy” choices as Bonnie otherwise, as the
smell of chocolate makes him lose his inhibitions. For any K, he chooses
C(K) =
8><>: {x 2 K : x is largest in K
⇤} if
"
Kcontains no chocolate-covered fruit
and K⇤ 6= ?
#
,
{x 2 K : x is largest in K} otherwise,
where K⇤ is again the set of fruits in K that are not the last available ones of their kind.
4.4 Reason-based explanations
As already anticipated, a choice function admits a reason-based explanation if it can be
explained by attributing a reasons structure to the agent. We now make this precise.
The set of potentially relevant properties: We begin by specifying a set P of
potentially relevant properties. It contains the properties that we, the modellers, have
at our disposal when we try to explain the agent’s choices. In our example, P might be
the set {big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering, polite}. The set P can be partitioned
into a set Poption of option properties, a set Pcontext of context properties, and a set
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Prelational of relational properties. Our specification of P can be viewed as a background
hypothesis to the e↵ect that no properties outside P make a di↵erence to the agent’s
choices, while at least some of the properties inside P might do so.4 Any subset of P
is called a property bundle. The following notation is useful. For any option x and any
context K, we write
• P(x,K) for the bundle of all properties of (x,K), formally {P 2 P : (x,K) 2 [P ]};
• P(x) for the bundle of option properties of x, formally P(x,K) \ Poption; and
• P(K) for the bundle of context properties of K, formally P(x,K) \ Pcontext.
A reasons structure: A reasons structure, R, is a pair (M, ) consisting of:
• A motivational salience function M (formally a function from K into 2P), which
assigns to each context K 2 K a set M(K) of motivationally salient properties in
context K. We require the function M to satisfy an invariance constraint : if two
contexts K and K 0 are such that P(K)=P(K 0), then M(K)=M(K 0).
• A fundamental preference relation   over property bundles (formally a binary
relation on 2P , on which we initially impose no restrictions). We write > and ⌘
for the strict and indi↵erence relations induced by  .
The function M specifies which properties the agent cares about in each context, and
the relation   specifies how he or she cares about these properties, by ranking di↵erent
property bundles relative to one another. The invariance constraint on M prevents
an empirically ungrounded ascription of motivational di↵erences across contexts. It
requires that any two contexts that have the same context properties induce the same
motivationally salient properties. So, if we wish to hypothesize that the agent cares
about di↵erent properties in contexts K and K 0, we must be able to point to some
di↵erence in context properties that lies behind this motivational di↵erence. Contexts
that do not di↵er in their context properties should be motivationally indistinguishable.
How reasons explain choices: According to the reasons structure R = (M, ):
• The agent perceives any option x in any context K as the bundle of motivationally
salient properties of (x,K), denoted xK = P(x,K) \M(K).
4Our criteria for specifying the set P may be analogous to the criteria by which statisticians specify the
potential explanatory and control variables in a regression analysis; i.e., P can be specified permissively,
but not unreasonably so. Defining P as the set of all logically possible properties, which contains a
property for every proper subset of X ⇥K, would not be good methodology, as explained later.
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• In any context K, the agent will choose the options which, when perceived in terms
of their motivationally salient properties in that context, are ranked most highly
by his or her fundamental preference relation, formally
CR(K) = {x 2 K : xK   yK for all y 2 K}.
We call CR (formally a function from K into 2X) the choice function induced by
R.5 (If   is insu ciently well-behaved, CR(K) may be empty for some K, so that
CR may only be an improper choice function.)
A choice function C : K ! 2X is reason-based explicable if there there exists a reasons
structure R (relative to the set P of properties) which induces that choice function (i.e.,
C = CR). We then call R a reason-based explanation for C. Whether a choice function
admits a reason-based explanation depends on the underlying set P of properties. We
return to the significance of this dependence later.
4.5 Revisiting the example
The four choice functions in our example all admit a reason-based explanation, where
P = {big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering, polite}.
Bon-vivant Bonnie’s choice function can be explained by the reasons structure
R = (M, ) where, for each context K,
M(K) = {big, medium, small} (so M is a constant function),
and the preference relation  places the three singleton property bundles {big}, {medium},
and {small} in the linear order satisfying
5Note that the agent’s fundamental preference relation   over property bundles, which does not
depend on the context, induces, for each context K, a context-specific preference relation over options
%K , defined as follows: for any x and y in X, x %K y , xK   yK . The choice function CM can
therefore equivalently be defined as follows: for each K,
CR(K) = {x 2 K : x %K y for all y 2 K}.
The equivalence between x %K y and xK   yK is worth commenting on. In the expression “x %K y”,
options are understood “objectively” (as elements of X), but the relation between them (%K) may
depend on the context. In the expression “xK   yK”, options are understood “subjectively” (as bundles
of motivationally salient properties), but the relation between them ( ) is context-independent. The
choice function induced by R can thus be interpreted in two ways: either as deriving from context-
independent preferences over context-dependent (“subjective”) options, or as deriving from context-
dependent preferences over context-independent (“objective”) options.
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{big} > {medium} > {small}.6
For instance, in a context K that o↵ers only a small apple a and a big banana b, Bonnie
perceives the two fruits as
aK = P(a,K) \M(K) = {small},
bK = P(b,K) \M(K) = {big},
and chooses the banana over the apple, because {big} > {small}.
Polite Pauline’s choice function can be explained by the reasons structure R =
(M, ) where, for each context K,
M(K) = {big, medium, small, polite} (so, again, M is a constant function),
and the preference relation  places the property bundles {big, polite}, {medium, polite},
{small, polite}, {big}, {medium} and {small} in the linear order satisfying
{big, polite} > {medium, polite} > {small, polite} > {big} > {medium} > {small}.
For instance, if only two small apples a and a0 and one big banana b are available in
context K, Pauline perceives the three fruits as
aK = P(a,K) \M(K) = {small, polite},
a0K = P(a0,K) \M(K) = {small, polite},
bK = P(b,K) \M(K) = {big},
and chooses one of the apples rather than the banana, because {small, polite} > {big}.
Chocoholic Coco’s choice function can be explained by the reasons structure R =
(M, ) where, for each context K,
M(K) =
8>>>><>>>>:
? if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
i.e., chocolate-o↵ering /2 P(K),
{big, medium, if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering 2 P(K),
and the preference relation   is the same as Bonnie’s, with the additional stipulation
that ? ⌘ ?. For instance, in a context without a tempting chocolate-covered fruit, Coco
picks any fruit indi↵erently, because he perceives every fruit as the same empty property
bundle ?, where ? ⌘ ?.
6Formally,   = {({big},{big}), ({big},{medium}), ({big},{small}), ({medium},{medium}),
({medium},{small}), ({small},{small})}.
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Weak-willed William’s choice function can be explained by the reasons structure
R = (M, ) where, for each context K,
M(K) =
8>>>><>>>>:
{big, medium, if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small, polite} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering /2 P(K),
{big, medium, if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small} i.e., chocolate-o↵ering 2 P(K),
and the preference relation   is the same as Pauline’s. So, if context K o↵ers only two
small apples a and a0 and one big banana b, then, undisturbed by any smell of chocolate,
William perceives these fruits as Pauline does and politely chooses a small apple. If
a small chocolate-covered pear is added to the basket, he forgets about politeness and
perceives the fruits as Bonnie does, choosing the big banana.
4.6 Two kinds of context-dependence
We say that an agent’s motivation, according to the reasons structure R = (M, ), is
• context-variant if M is a non-constant function (i.e., M(K) is not the same for all
K 2 K), and context-invariant otherwise;
• context-related if the motivationally salient properties that are specified by M
include context-related properties (i.e., M(K) contains at least one relational or
context property for some K 2 K), and context-unrelated otherwise.
In our example, Polite Pauline displays context-related motivation: the relational prop-
erty “polite” is motivationally salient for her. By contrast, Chocoholic Coco displays
context-variant motivation: the properties that are motivationally salient for him vary
with the context. Weak-willed William displays both kinds of context-dependent mo-
tivation: he sometimes cares about the relational property “polite”, and he also cares
about di↵erent properties in di↵erent contexts. Bon-vivant Bonnie, finally, illustrates
the classical case of fully context-independent motivation.
How do the two kinds of context-dependence a↵ect an agent’s perception of the op-
tions in each context? Table 1 shows how a given option x is perceived in context K,
depending on which of the two kinds of context-dependence are present. Generally, when
both kinds of context-dependence may be present, option x is perceived in context K as
xK = P(x,K) \M(K). This may depend on the context in two places: first, in the set
of properties of the option-context pair (x,K); and second, in the set of motivationally
salient properties in context K. If the agent’s motivation is context-unrelated, the first
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Context-variant motivation?
Yes No
Context-related
motivation?
Yes
xK = P(x,K) \M(K)
(e.g., William)
xK = P(x,K) \M
(e.g., Pauline)
No
xK = P(x) \M(K)
(e.g., Coco)
xK = P(x) \M
(e.g., Bonnie)
Table 1: The agent’s perception of option x in context K
instance of context-dependence disappears, and P(x,K) can be replaced by P(x). Here,
M(K) contains only option properties, so that P(x,K) \M(K) = P(x) \M(K). If
the agent’s motivation is context-invariant, the second instance of context-dependence
disappears, and M(K) can be replaced by a fixed set M of motivationally salient prop-
erties. Here, the motivational salience function is constant, so that the first component
of the reasons structure (M, ) can be identified with a fixed set M . In the context-
independent case, finally, the agent’s perception of option x in context K simplifies to
xK = P(x) \M .
From a classical perspective, agents with context-variant motivation – e.g., whose
motivation varies as a result of subtle environmental features like the smell of chocolate
– would count as boundedly rational. Bonnie exemplifies the case of classical rational-
ity: her motivation is completely context-independent. Pauline displays sophisticated
rational behaviour: she considers not only properties of the options, but also context-
related properties, such as politeness. William tries to display the same sophisticated
behaviour, but is susceptible to variations in motivation across di↵erent contexts. Coco,
finally, focuses only on option properties, but, like William, lacks a stable motivation.
5 When does a choice function admit a reason-based
explanation?
5.1 An axiomatic characterization
In what follows, we state three jointly necessary and su cient conditions which a choice
function C : K ! 2X must satisfy to admit a reason-based explanation. In line with
convention, we call these conditions “axioms”, though we do not take their satisfaction
for granted: it is an empirical question whether an agent’s choice function satisfies them.
Our axioms are each stated relative to a set P of properties. As already noted,
whether there is a reason-based explanation for a given choice function depends on the
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set of properties we have at our disposal in constructing this explanation. Our axioms
are jointly less restrictive if P is rich than if it is sparse: it is easier to give a reason-based
explanation if we have lots of properties at our disposal than if we have only a few.
We begin with an “intra-context” axiom. It says that the agent’s choice in any
context does not distinguish between options that have the same properties in that
context:
Axiom 1 For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if P(x,K) = P(y,K), then
x 2 C(K), y 2 C(K).
The second axiom is an “inter-context” axiom. It says that if two contexts o↵er
the same feasible property bundles, the agent chooses options instantiating the same
property bundles in those contexts:
Axiom 2 For all contexts K,K 0 2 K, if {P(x,K) : x 2 K} = {P(x,K 0) : x 2 K 0}, then
{P(x,K) : x 2 C(K)} = {P(x,K 0) : x 2 C(K 0)}.7
Axioms 1 and 2 jointly imply that choice is based on the properties in P, but they
do not yet imply any maximizing behaviour.8 This gap is filled by our third axiom, a
variant of Richter’s original axiom of Revelation Coherence, as introduced in Section 2.
Unlike Richter’s axiom, ours is formulated at the level of property bundles, not options.
We adapt some revealed-preference terminology. For any property bundles S and S0:
• S is feasible in context K if S = P(x,K) for some feasible option x 2 K;
• S is chosen in context K if S = P(x,K) for some option x 2 C(K);
• S is revealed weakly preferred to S0 (formally S %C S0) if, in some context, S is
chosen while S0 is feasible.
Axiom 3 Whenever a property bundle S ✓ P is feasible in a context K 2 K and
is revealed weakly preferred to every feasible property bundle in context K, then S is
7This is distinct from requiring that the same options be chosen in those contexts. The axiom
further requires no relationship between choices in contexts with di↵erent context properties, i.e., where
P(K) 6= P(K0), since such contexts automatically o↵er di↵erent feasible property bundles.
8They are jointly equivalent to choice being explicable by the attribution of a generalized reasons
structure, defined by (i) a motivational salience function and (ii) a choice function defined over property
bundles (which is more general than a fundamental preference relation   over property bundles).
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chosen in context K.9
Note the following:
Lemma 1 Axiom 3 strengthens Axiom 2.
We can now state our main characterization theorem:
Theorem 1 A choice function C admits a reason-based explanation if and only if it
satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and therefore 2).10
This result holds for every underlying set P of properties. We can thus use our
framework to assess whether a given choice function admits a reason-based explanation
relative to di↵erent sets of properties. We can ask, for instance: can we explain a car
buyer’s choice function by reference to a set of colour-related properties? By reference
to a set of status-related properties? Or by reference to a set of sustainability- and
price-related properties? In each case, our axioms, interpreted in terms of the relevant
set P, provide the required conditions.11
Reason-based explanations need not be unique. For a given choice function C, there
may exist more than one reasons structure R such that C = CR. This non-uniqueness
can be reduced if we impose further restrictions on the admissible reasons structures.
In Appendix A, we state some additional characterization results, identifying conditions
under which a choice function admits a reason-based explanation that is restricted to
only one, or none, of the two kinds of context-dependence we have introduced. Di↵erent
reason-based explanations for the same choice function are by no means equivalent:
they attribute a di↵erent motivational psychology to the agent and may lead to di↵erent
predictions for novel choice contexts, as shown in Section 7.
9Like Axiom 2, this axiom imposes “inter-context” contraints only among contexts with the same
context properties, because all contexts in which a given property bundle is feasible must have the same
context properties. One must not interpret the revealed-preference relation %C as representing funda-
mental preferences. When the agent revealed-prefers bundle S to bundle S0 by choosing S over S0 in
some context, only some subsets of S and S0 are usually motivationally salient, and the fundamental
preference is held between these, not between S and S0. The revealed-preference relation %C over prop-
erty bundles induces a context-variant revealed-preference relation %CK over options: x is revealed weakly
preferred to y in context K (x %CK y) if and only if P(x,K) %C P(y,K). In classical choice theory, with-
out properties, it is hard to define an interesting notion of context-variant revealed preference. Classical
revealed preferences are context-invariant and fail to rationalize many observable choice behaviours.
10Axioms 1 and 3 are jointly equivalent to the requirement that, for every K 2 K and every x 2 K, if
P(x,K) is revealed weakly preferred to P(y,K) for every y 2 K, then x 2 C(K).
11To make this explicit, we could restate Theorem 1 (and similarly other results) as follows: For every
set P of properties, a choice function C admits a reason-based explanation relative to P if and only if it
satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and therefore 2) relative to P.
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5.2 The choice-behavioural falsifiability of reason-based explanations
A key desideratum on any scientific theory is its falsifiability: it must be possible for the
theory to be false. A theory that can “explain” everything does not explain anything.
Theories of individual choice should be no exception. Choice theorists typically focus
on choice-behavioural falsifiability. Although we think that there is no strong scientific
reason to restrict the empirical evidence base to choice behaviour alone (which would
exclude, for instance, other psychological data), we temporarily follow convention and
focus on choice-behavourial falsifiability too (cf. Dietrich and List 2012). How do reason-
based explanations fare in this respect?
To answer this question, we must distinguish between two di↵erent senses in which
reason-based explanations o↵er a theory of choice. On one interpretation, the specific
reason-based explanation that we give for an agent’s choices is our theory. On another
interpretation, the reason-based framework in its entirety is our theory.12
A specific reason-based explanation as a theory: If an agent’s choice function C is
the observable object that we seek to explain, then the specific reasons structure R that
we attribute to the agent can be viewed as the theory that we o↵er as an explanation.
This theory, which we label TR, has the form:
“R is the agent’s reasons structure (which implies C = CR).”
This theory is clearly choice-behaviourally falsifiable. In particular, it is falsified if R
fails to induce C (i.e., CR 6= C) and corroborated otherwise (i.e., CR = C).
The reason-based framework as a theory: The broader message of our framework
is that choices are “reason-based”. Applying this to a particular agent, we can view the
assertion that the agent’s choice function C admits some reason-based explanation as
our theory. Here, the theory, which we label T9R, has the form:
“There is some R (relative to set P of properties) such that
R is the agent’s reasons structure (which implies C = CR).”
Whether this theory is choice-behaviourally falsifiable depends on the set P of properties
relative to which it is asserted. If we are su ciently disciplined in our specification
of P, then T9R is choice-behaviourally falsifiable. With respect to many reasonable
specifications of P (e.g., P = {big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering, polite} in our
12A parallel distinction could be drawn in relation to classical rationalization concepts too.
22
example), only some but not all choice functions satisfy our axioms for reason-based
explicability. Hence T9R is falsified if the agent’s choice function violates our axioms,
and corroborated otherwise. Note that T9R is equivalent to the conjunction of Axioms
1, 2, and 3. By contrast, if we specify the set P too permissively, then T9R may become
choice-behaviourally unfalsifiable, as shown in the next subsection.
5.3 The significance of our auxiliary hypothesis
We have noted that the specification of P is a crucial auxiliary hypothesis. It deems all
properties that are outside that set irrelevant to the agent’s choices. This allows us to rule
out reason-based explanations that are too far-fetched – for instance, because they invoke
properties which do not plausibly matter psychologically, such as whether there is an
even (rather than odd) number of letters on the yoghurt label. Far-fetched explanations,
in turn, may not generate reliable predictions of future choices, as discussed later.
Let us illustrate how reason-based explicability will become too permissive and
thereby substantively unilluminating if we specify P too liberally. Suppose, for instance,
we take P to include all properties of the form:
P(x,K) : “The option-context pair is (x,K)”,
where x is an option and K a context in which x is feasible. Let PX⇥K be the set of
all such maximally specific properties – “maximally specific” because the extension of
P(x,K) consists solely of the pair (x,K). It it easy to see that any logically possible
choice function C will admit a reason-based explanation whenever P ◆ PX⇥K. Simply
define R = (M, ) as follows:
• M(K) = PX⇥K for every context K;
• for any options x and y and any context K, {P(x,K)}   {P(y,K)} if and only if x is
weakly chosen over y in context K.
In other words, Axioms 1 to 3 become vacuous when P ◆ PX⇥K, so that T9R becomes
a tautology relative to such a set P.
However, the present reasons structure R does not provide an illuminating explana-
tion of the choice function C. It accounts for the agent’s choices essentially by saying
that the agent chooses option x over option y in context K because he or she fundamen-
tally prefers “x in K” to “y in K”. This is as unilluminating as saying “I preferred one
to the other” in answer to the question “why did you choose teaching rather than bank-
ing as your career”. A plausible auxiliary hypothesis would exclude maximally specific
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properties from the set P, unless we have a special reason to include them. Recall that
our goal is to identify properties that could make a psychologically plausible di↵erence
to the agent’s choices.
5.4 Does the reliance on an auxiliary hypothesis make reason-based
explanations ad hoc?
The reliance on an auxiliary hypothesis, encoded by P, does not render the notion of
reason-based explanation ad hoc. It is well known since the works of Duhem and Quine
that practically all scientific theories rest on some auxiliary hypotheses. When we test
a theory empirically, we are, in e↵ect, testing its conjunction with certain auxiliary
hypotheses. Any apparently disconfirming evidence will seldom su ce to falsify the
theory by itself, but will falsify it only relative to those auxiliary hypotheses. A stubborn
supporter of the theory can always insist that the theory is correct and respond to the
evidence by revising the auxiliary hypotheses.
This is famously illustrated by a 19th century episode from physics. It then be-
came evident that Mercury’s orbit deviated from the one predicted by Newton’s theory.
But rather than admitting that Newton’s theory was falsified by this observation, some
scholars, such as the mathematican Urbain Le Verrier, postulated the existence of an
additional planet (“Vulcan”), whose gravitational influence would allow us to accommo-
date Mercury’s orbit within Newton’s theory. Eventually, of course, Newton’s theory
became overwhelmed with recalcitrant evidence, and it was superseded by Einstein’s.
Our claim is that the theory of individual choice is not di↵erent from other scientific
theories in its reliance on auxiliary hypotheses. This is often insu ciently acknowledged.
We have heard some people suggest (e.g., in discussions of this paper) that the classical
notion of rationalization by a preference relation is purely choice-behavioural and free
from auxiliary hypotheses. But this is simply not true. The key auxiliary hypothesis of
classical rational choice theory is its specification of the options. Although the options
are usually treated as exogenously given, the modeller is implicitly asserting an auxiliary
hypotheses when he or she specifies them. Just as our notion of reason-based explicability
becomes choice-behaviourally unfalsifiable when the set P of properties is specified too
permissively, so the classical notion of rationalizability by a preference relation becomes
equally unfalsifiable when the set X of options is specified too fine-grainedly.
To illustrate, let C (a function from K into 2X) be any choice function. Simply
respecify the options as follows. Let X 0 be the set of all pairs of the form (x,K), where
x is an option in X and K is a context in which x is feasible. Let K0 be the result of
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replacing every original context K in K with
K 0 = {(x,K) : x 2 K}.
Suppose we now reinterpret the original choice function C as a function C 0 from K0 into
2X
0
in the following way: for each K 0 in K0, let
C 0(K 0) = {(y,K) : y=C(K), where K is the context in K to which K 0 corresponds}.
Then C 0 will of course be rationalizable by a preference relation on X 0, because each
respecified option occurs in precisely one context. And this is so, whether or not the
orginal choice function C was rationalizable by a preference relation on X. Crucially,
from a choice-behavioural perspective, the functions C and C 0 are indistinguishable.
The upshot is this: by representing an agent’s choices in terms of a su ciently fine-
grained set of options, we can always “rationalize” any choice behaviour by a preference
relation. And so, the hypothesis that the agent’s choices are rationalizable by a pref-
erence relation is choice-behaviourally falsifiable only in conjunction with an auxiliary
hypothesis, namely a hypothesis concerning the nature of the options. This issue is of-
ten swept under the carpet. (For a notable exception, which includes a more elaborate
formal argument for the point we have just made, see Bhattacharyya et al. 2011.) Our
framework makes the role played by auxiliary hypotheses transparent.
5.5 Criteria for selecting an explanation in cases of non-uniqueness
We have clarified the sense in which reason-based explanations are choice-behaviourally
falsifiable. But we still need to comment on their possible non-uniqueness, relative
to choice-behavioural evidence. How can we select a reason-based explanation when
the same choice function can be explained in more than one way?13 This question
matters because di↵erent explanations give di↵erent accounts of the agent’s motivational
psychology, by attributing di↵erent reasons structures to him or her. These, in turn,
may lead to di↵erent predictions for the agent’s future choices, as discussed in Section 7.
There are at least three kinds of criteria for deciding which reasons structureR = (M, )
to attribute to the agent when there are multiple competing ones:
13Non-uniqueness in the rationalization of choice behaviour is familiar from classical choice theory,
where the same choice function can often be rationalized by more than one binary relation over the
options. The relation becomes unique if the domain of the choice function (i.e., the set of contexts in
which choice is observed) is “rich”, i.e., contains all sets of one or two options.
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Choice-behavioural di↵erence-making criteria: These require that, as far as
possible:
(i) the motivational salience function M deem only those properties motivationally
salient that make an observable di↵erence to the agent’s choice behaviour, and
(ii) the fundamental preference relation   over property bundles be systematically de-
rived from the agent’s choice behaviour.
The goal is to minimize behaviourally ungrounded ascriptions of motivation and funda-
mental preference. We give one example of such a criterion in Appendix A.3.
Non-choice data: Verbal reports or neurophysiological data, such as responses to
property-related stimuli, may help us test hypotheses about
(i) which properties are motivationally salient for the agent in context K and thus
belong to M(K),
(ii) which context properties causally a↵ect motivational salience, so that M(K) may
vary as contexts K vary in those properties, and
(iii) which property bundles the agent fundamentally prefers to which others.
One might hypothesize that human beings have better conscious access to how they
perceive the options in a given context K and therefore to the properties in M(K) than
to the context properties that a↵ect what M(K) is (i.e., those properties which, in an
empirical study, might be significant explanatory variables for M). Some changes in
M(K) might be due to subconscious influences, as in framing or nudging e↵ects. If so,
verbal reports may be more relevant to questions (i) and (iii) than to question (ii).
Parsimony criteria: We may try to select a parsimonious reasons structure, where
(i) the sets M(K) of motivationally salient properties generated by M are (a) as small
as possible and (b) as unchanging as possible across di↵erent K, and
(ii) the relation   is as sparse as possible (e.g., defined over the fewest possible property
bundles).
There may be a trade-o↵ between di↵erent dimensions of parsimony. If the sets M(K)
contain only few properties, they may not be stable across di↵erentK, and vice versa. As
shown in Appendix B, we can always formally achieve context-invariance by defining M
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constantly as the entire set P and the fundamental preference relation   as the revealed
preference relation %C over property bundles. This makes the sets M(K) unchanging
but very large, and hence perhaps psychologically implausible. Conversely, making each
M(K) small might require context-variance.
5.6 Classical rationalizability as a special case
Finally, we wish to note that the notion of rationalizability by a preference relation can
be recovered as a special case of reason-based explicability. Simply take P = PX , defined
as the set of all properties of the form
Px : “The option is x”,
where x is an element of X. The extension of each such property Px is the set of all
option-context pairs in which x is the option (i.e., [Px] = {(x,K) : K 2 K}). Then the
choice function C is classically rationalizable by a preference relation if and only if it
can be explained by the reasons structure R = (M, ), where
• M(K) = PX for every context K; and
• for any options x and y and any context K, {Px}   {Py} if and only if x is weakly
chosen over y in some context K.
Of course, this reason-based explanation would be unilluminating, since it would always
cite an option’s “being that option” as the reason for choosing it. Nonetheless, the
present formal observations help us compare the notion of reason-based explanation
with its classical counterpart.
6 Some applications
To illustrate the generality of our framework, we briefly show how it can accommodate
some much-discussed non-classical choice behaviours.
6.1 Framing e↵ects
As illustrated by Kahneman and Tversky’s influential works (e.g., 1981), a framing e↵ect
occurs when an agent makes di↵erent choices in “extensionally equivalent” contexts, i.e.,
contexts which, from an “objective” perspective, o↵er the same options but which are
somehow “framed” (described, labelled, presented, ...) in di↵erent ways. For instance,
an agent may reverse his or her choice over public-health programmes, depending on
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whether these are framed in terms of the number of lives lost or in terms of the number
of lives saved. For instance, saving m out of n lives (while not saving the remaining
n m) is the same as losing n m out of n lives (while saving the remaining m). Yet,
people’s choice dispositions may depend on the wording used.
Formally, a framing e↵ect can be understood as a special kind of choice reversal. A
choice reversal occurs when there are contexts K and K 0 and options x and y such that
x is chosen over y in K and y is chosen over x in K 0, where at least one choice is strict.
Suppose R = (M, ) is the agent’s reasons structure in our framework. Then there may
be two possible sources of choice reversals (as well as mixtures of the two).
• One possible source is context-variance. Here, the two contexts K and K 0 in which
a choice reversal occurs induce di↵erent sets of motivationally salient properties
M(K) 6=M(K 0), where both M(K) and M(K 0) contain only option properties.
• Another possible source of a choice reversal is context-relatedness. Here, contexts
K andK 0 induce the same set of motivationally salient propertiesM(K) =M(K 0),
but this set contains some relational or context properties that distinguish between
x and y in the two contexts.
In either case, the agent prefers x to y as perceived in context K, and prefers y to x as
perceived in context K 0, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A choice reversal
Since framing e↵ects are usually thought to be sub-rational or sub-conscious, we
may define a framing e↵ect as a choice reversal whose source is context-variance (not
context-relatedness).14 We may then define the frame in each context K simply as the
14Note that whether a choice reversal counts as a framing e↵ect under this definition depends on the
reasons structure we attribute to the agent.
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set of context properties of K, formally P(K).15
6.2 Checklists or “take-the-best” heuristics
Choices by checklist or “take-the-best” heuristics have received much attention in recent
work in economics and psychology. Gigerenzer et al. (2000) give several empirical
examples of such choice procedures, and Mandler et al. (2012) o↵er a formal analysis.
For a related logical analysis, see also de Jongh and Liu (2009). Under a checklist or
“take-the-best” approach, the agent considers a list of criteria by which the options can
be distinguished and places the criteria in some order of importance. For any set of
feasible options, the agent first compares the options in terms of the first criterion; if
there are ties, he or she moves on to the second criterion; if there are still ties, he or she
moves on to the third; and so on.
In our framework, we can explain such choice behaviour by a reasons structure R =
(M, ) with a lexicographic fundamental preference relation  , where property bundles
are ranked on the basis of some order of importance over properties. To illustrate, let
P1, P2, P3, ... denote the first, second, third, ..., properties in this order (assuming a
finite P). We can then define the fundamental preference relation   as follows: for any
property bundles S1 and S2, let S1   S2 if and only if either S1 = S2 or there is some n
such that (i) Pn 2 S1, (ii) Pn /2 S2, and (iii) S1 \ {P1, ..., Pn 1} = S2 \ {P1, ..., Pn 1}.
A lexicographic fundamental preference relation can be combined with either context-
variant or context-invariant motivation, and with either context-related or context-
unrelated motivation. This opens up greater generality than usually acknowledged in
standard discussions of checklists or “take-the-best” heuristics. (For a generalization of
the checklist model to variable checklists, see Manzini and Mariotti 2012.)
6.3 Non-consequentialism
A non-consequentialist agent makes a choice in a given context not just on the basis of
the chosen option itself (the “consequence”), but also on the basis of what the choice
15IfK andK0 o↵er the same feasible options, then the di↵erence in frame can only be due to di↵erences
in context beyond the feasible set, which presupposes our generalized (“non-extensional”) notion of
context (similar to the one in Salant and Rubinstein 2008). If K and K0 o↵er di↵erent feasible options,
the di↵erence in frame could stem from that di↵erence in options alone. This sort of framing e↵ect –
driven by the presence or absence of some feasible options rather than by their “presentation” – di↵ers
from the framing e↵ects studied by Salant and Rubinstein; it does not presuppose the “non-extensional”
notion of context. Finally, under a more sophisticated definition, the frame in context K could be the
set of those context properties of K that are “causally relevant” for M(K), as discussed in Section 7.
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context is or how each option relates to it (the “act of choosing the option”). Any context-
related motivation can thus be viewed as a form of non-consequentialism. Many moral
theories, such as deontological ones, recommend non-consequentialist forms of choice.
More narrowly, we may describe a non-consequentialist as someone who cares about
whether each option is “permissible” or “norm-conforming” in a given context. The
relevant criterion may be, for example, politeness, legality, or moral permissibility in
the context. Let us introduce a relational property P such that any option-context pair
(x,K) satisfies P if and only if the choice of x is deemed permissible or norm-conforming
in context K. If P is in every M(K) and the fundamental preference relation ranks
property bundles that include P above bundles that do not, the agent will always choose
a permissible or norm-conforming option, unless no such option is feasible.
Note that this could not generally be modelled without context-related motivation.
(For earlier discussions of non-consequentialist choices, see, e.g., Suzumura and Xu 2001
and Gaertner and Xu 2004.)
6.4 The two kinds of context-dependence in the literature
Before turning to the prediction of choices in novel contexts, we want to discuss briefly
how our framework relates to some earlier work on context-dependent choice. We focus
on two pairs of papers: first, Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel
(2009); second, Bossert and Suzumura (2009) and Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu
(2011). Although these works do not distinguish between our two kinds of context-
dependence, we can interpret each as studying one of these two kinds.
Salant and Rubinstein (hereafter S&R) and Bernheim and Rangel (hereafter B&R)
develop two related frameworks in which choices are a↵ected by an external factor. In
each framework, choice contexts are described as pairs (Y, ) of a feasible set Y and an
environmental parameter  , which is the “frame” in S&R or the “ancillary condition” in
B&R. The two frameworks can be interpreted as models of context-variant rather than
context-related motivation. S&R’s frame captures “information that is irrelevant in the
rational assessment of the alternatives, but nonetheless a↵ects choice” (p. 1287). B&R’s
ancillary condition captures normatively irrelevant features a↵ecting choice.16 Despite
the similarity between the notions of a frame and an ancillary condition, there are formal
and interpretational di↵erences between S&R and B&R. S&R focus on the behavioural
16S&R analyse context-variance by focusing on choice functions (called “salient consideration func-
tions”) for which, in any context (Y, ), the agent chooses the % -best option from Y , where %  is some
frame-dependent linear preference relation over options.
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implications of frame-dependence, B&R on choice-based welfare judgments.17
Bossert and Suzumura (hereafter B&S) and Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu (here-
after B&P&X) investigate what we would describe as context-relatedness. B&S assume
that, in any given choice context, a feasible option may or may not be compatible with
some exogenously given “norms”. In our example, picking the only available apple would
violate a politeness norm. B&S axiomatically characterize those choice functions which
are norm-conditionally rationalizable: there exists a preference relation over options such
that, in any context, the agent chooses the most preferred norm-compatible feasible op-
tion. One may think of such a rationalization as being “partially reason-based”. Each
norm gives rise to a context-related property: the property of obeying that norm. Every
property of this kind is taken to be desirable and motivationally salient in each context.
The agent’s choice of a norm-compatible option is then explained by the fact that the
option has all such properties (i.e., of obeying the norms in question). By contrast, the
question of which option among the norm-compatible ones is chosen is not explained in
terms of reasons (properties), but in terms of a classical preference relation over primitive
options. B&P&X take a di↵erent approach. Like us, they model the agent’s perception
of the options, yet not by invoking properties, but by refining the notion of an option
via adding certain relevant information about the context. To describe Polite Pauline in
our example, the options (fruits) would have to be refined by including the information
of whether or not the context o↵ers another fruit of the same kind. This refinement is
carried out via a technical construction.18 B&P&X show that an agent whose choices
among refined options are fully rational may nonetheless look irrational if his or her
choice function is defined over non-refined options.
We thus note that while each of the two forms of context-dependence has been studied
separately, the previous literature does not o↵er a joint framework accomodating both.
17Deeply rooted in the behaviourist tradition, B&R propose to base judgments about an agent’s welfare
solely on the agent’s choices, arguing that such welfare judgments may be possible even in cases in which
they cannot be based on classical revealed preferences because choice is not rationalizable by a preference
relation. Our own view is that welfare is not reducible to either choices or preferences (whether revealed
or not). Welfare is a distinct concept, which we do not address in this paper.
18For B&P&X, a refined option is not simply an option-context pair (x,K), since this potentially
contains too much information. Rather, B&P&X define refined options as certain equivalence classes of
such pairs. In the limiting, classical case, the context is totally irrelevant, so that any pairs (x,K) and
(x,K0) count as equivalent; here, refined options reduce to options in the original sense.
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7 Predicting choices in novel contexts
Standard choice theory is limited in its ability to predict choices in novel, previously un-
observed contexts (see Bermudez 2009). In most empirical sciences, we make predictions
about future (or otherwise unobserved) events, based on past observations. Astronomers
predict future solar eclipses or paths of comets based on past trajectories of the relevant
celestial bodies; epidemiologists predict future epidemics based on past epidemiological
data; and econometricians use past data of the economy to predict its future. In choice
theory, by contrast, observations and predictions are often taken to be the same thing:
the choice function is the observed and predicted object at once.
Genuine predictions would have to be about choice contexts outside the observed
domain, perhaps with feasible options that the agent has not previously encountered. If
we rationalize choices simply by a preference relation on a given set of options, it is not
easy to extrapolate this preference relation to new options (though suitable extrapola-
tions are sometimes constructed in consumer theory).19 On the classical approach, we
can make only two rather limited kinds of predictions:
• Any choice function on a given set of contexts can predict choices when the same
contexts recur in the future. But here the preference relation does no work, since
even a not-yet-rationalized choice function entails the same predictions.
• A preference relation might be used to predict choices in “new” contexts when
those contexts involve only options over which the preference relation is already
defined. We would then predict that the agent will maximize the same preference
relation over the feasible options.
These limitations are a consequence of the parsimonious informational basis of classical
choice theory. We now show that the additional resources of our reason-based model
allow us to move beyond these limitations.20
7.1 A framework for predictions
Suppose that we have observed the agent’s choices, not for the entire domain K of
contexts, but only for some subdomain Ko ✓ K. We call Ko the domain of observed
19For discussions of predictions in classical revealed-preference theory, see, e.g., Varian (2006) and
Blundell (2005).
20Blundell (2005) mentions a Gorman-Lancaster-style model of characteristics as a promising direction
for revealed-preference analysis; see Blow et al. (2008). Since our property-based approach has a Gorman-
Lancaster-style flavour, it is consistent with Blundell’s point, albeit at a somewhat more abstract level.
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contexts. We then write Co to denote the agent’s choice function restricted to that
subdomain and call it the observed choice function. Formally, Co is a function from Ko
into 2X . The agent’s “full” choice function C, which we have not yet observed, is an
extension of Co to the domain K.
The new contexts outside the observed domain (i.e., those in K\Ko) may o↵er options
that were not o↵ered by any of the contexts in Ko. Formally, the set X of all options
can be a proper superset of the set Xo of previously observed options.21
Our goal is to predict as much of the “true” choice function C as possible, on the basis
of the observed choice function Co. A choice predictor is a choice function ⇡ on some
domain D ✓ K, where typically Ko ✓ D ✓ K. For each K in D, ⇡(K) is the predicted
choice in context K. The predictor is accurate if it predicts the agent’s choices correctly
in all contexts in D, i.e., if ⇡(K) = C(K) for all K in D.
As noted above, if we were to explain the observed choice function Co simply by
attributing a preference relation to the agent, this would leave any options outside the
set Xo unranked and would therefore allow us to define predictors only for “old” contexts
K 2 Ko or for “new” contexts K 62 Ko containing only “old” options from Xo. Our
reason-based approach can go further. We define a choice predictor as follows:
• Start from a reasons structure R = (M, ) for the observed domain Ko, where R
explains the observed choice function Co.
• Extend this to a reasons structureR0 = (M 0, ) for some domainD withKo ✓ D ✓ K.
• Define a choice predictor on D as the choice function ⇡ := CM0 induced by this
extended reasons structure.
By an extension of the reasons structure R = (M, ) to the domain D ◆ Ko we mean
a reasons structure R0 = (M 0, ) for domain D whose restriction to Ko is R, i.e., (i)
the restriction of the function M 0 to the subdomain Ko is M , and (ii) R and R0 use the
same fundamental preference relation  .22
21Note that Xo =
S
K2Ko
[K]. It is also natural to assume that X =
S
K2K
[K]. The framework in Sections
3 to 6 can also be interpreted as referring only to observed choice, which in this new notation requires
substituting X0 for X, Ko for K, and C0 for C. This interpretation was implicit in our exposition so far,
though all our results hold regardless of whether X, K, and C refer only to “observed” options, contexts,
and choices, or to the “full” sets of options, contexts, and choices.
22The use of two distinct specifications of the options and contexts (i.e., X0 and Ko versus X and
K) raises a complication. Recall our categorization of properties into option, context, and relational
properties. This was defined by quantifying over a given set of options and a given set of contexts.
Since we are now working with larger and smaller such sets, we assume (for expositional simplicity) that
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7.2 Cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous prediction
We introduce three reason-based choice predictors. Each is based on a reasons
structure R = (M, ) on the domain Ko which explains the agent’s observed choices,
i.e., Co = CR.23
Cautious prediction: The cautious predictor (based on R) is the choice function ⇡ :=
CR0 induced by the extended reasons structure R0 = (M 0, ) whose domain D consists
of every context K 2 K such that K o↵ers the same feasible property bundles as some
observed context Ko 2 Ko:
{P(x,K) : x 2 K} = {P(x,Ko) : x 2 Ko}. (1)
Note that (1) implies P(K) = P(Ko), so that M 0(K) must equal M 0(Ko), which, in
turn, must equal M(Ko), because M 0 coincides with M for any observed context (in
Ko). By implication, the extension R0 of R is uniquely defined.
The cautious predictor makes predictions only for choice contexts that o↵er the same
feasible property bundles as some observed context. This ignores the fact that reason-
based choices depend only on motivationally salient properties. If we have observed
Bonnie’s choices only for some subset Ko of the set K of all possible fruit baskets, the
cautious predictor cannot predict her choices from a “new” fruit basket (in K\Ko) that
is identical to some “old” basket (in Ko) in terms of the sizes of available fruit but not
in terms of other, non-salient properties. We now introduce a predictor that is based
not on entire property bundles but only on bundles of motivationally salient properties.
Semi-courageous prediction: The semi-courageous predictor (based on R) is the
choice function ⇡ := CR0 induced by the extended reasons structure R0 = (M 0, )
whose domain D consists of every context K 2 K such that
(i) K has the same context properties as some observed context, i.e., P(K) = P(Ko)
for some Ko in Ko (so that M 0(K) =M(Ko)), and
this categorization remains the same, regardless of whether we are quantifying over X0 and Ko or over
X and K. The categorization will then also be the same for any “intermediate” sets of options and
contexts. This ensures that some key notions (such as the invariance condition on motivational salience,
which invokes context properties, or the notion of context-relatedness) do not change their meaning
depending on whether we refer to the “observed” domain or to the “full” domain. Roughly speaking,
our assumption holds as long as the sets X0 and Ko are su ciently large (e.g., if Ko contained only a
single context, then no property could count as context-related when quantifying only over Ko).
23Our results on courageous prediction (Proposition 2, Remark 1(c), and Thoerem 2(c)) assume that
each context K in K has only finitely many context properties.
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(ii) the set of options as perceived in K (feasible bundles of motivationally salient
properties) is the same as that in some observed context, i.e., {xK : x 2 K} =
{xK0o : x 2 K 0o} for some K 0o in Ko.
Note that Ko and K 0o in clauses (i) and (ii) can be distinct. Although the semi-
courageous predictor can predict choices in contexts o↵ering new feasible property bun-
dles, it is still somewhat restrictive. Clause (i) is often unnecessarily demanding. Its
role is to tell us how we must define M 0(K), namely as M(Ko). Sometimes, however,
we can infer how to define M 0(K) without clause (i). Consider, for example, an agent
with context-invariant motivation, according to R. If we are willing to assume that his
or her motivation remains context-invariant in new contexts, we can define M 0(K) as
unchanged outside K. This suggests the following, more general predictor.
Courageous prediction: We begin with a preliminary definition. In a reasons struc-
ture R0 = (M 0, ) for some domain D, we call a context property P causally relevant if
its presence or absence in a context can make a di↵erence to the agent’s set of motiva-
tionally salient properties in it, i.e., if there are contexts K,K 0 2 D such that
(cau1) K has property P while K 0 does not (or vice versa),
(cau2) K and K 0 induce di↵erent sets of motivationally salient properties, i.e.,M 0(K) 6=
M 0(K 0),
(cau3) K and K 0 di↵er minimally, i.e., there is no context K 00 2 D whose set of context
properties P(K 00) is strictly between the sets P(K) and P(K 0).24
Let CAUR0 denote the set of causally relevant context properties in the reasons structure
R0. Two things are worth noting. First, in the special case of context-invariant moti-
vation, no context property is causally relevant. Second, the causally relevant context
properties fully determine the agent’s set of motivationally salient properties. Formally:
Proposition 2 Let R0 = (M 0, ) be any reasons structure (for some domain D of
contexts). Then:
24This clause rules out thatK andK0 di↵er in context properties unrelated to P to which the di↵erence
in motivation between K and K0 could be causally attributed. Here are some relevant background
definitions: two property bundles agree on a property P 2 P if both or neither contain P . A property
bundle S is weakly between two property bundles T and T 0 if S agrees with each of T and T 0 on every
property on which they agree. If, in addition, S is distinct from each of T and T 0, then S is strictly
between T and T 0. For instance, {P,Q} is strictly between {P} and {Q}, as is ?.
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(a) R0 displays context-invariant motivation if and only if CAUR0 = ?.
(b) For all K, K 0 in K, if P(K) \ CAUR0 = P(K 0) \ CAUR0 then M 0(K) =M 0(K 0).
The courageous predictor (based on R) is the choice function ⇡ := CR0 induced by
the extended reasons structure R0 = (M 0, ) whose domain D consists of every context
K 2 K such that
(i*) K has the same causally relevant properties as some observed context, i.e., P(K)\
CAUR = P(Ko) \ CAUR for some Ko in Ko; we then define M 0(K) as M(Ko);25
and
(ii) the set of options as perceived in K is the same as that in some observed context,
i.e., {xK : x 2 K} = {xK0o : x 2 K 0o} for some K 0o in Ko.
Our three predictors are increasingly general:
Remark 1 Given a reason-based explanation R of the observed choice function Co,
(a) the cautious predictor extends the observed choice function Co;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor extends the cautious predictor; and
(c) the courageous predictor extends the semi-courageous predictor.26
7.3 When is each choice predictor accurate?
It turns out that the accuracy of each predictor depends on whether certain observed
patterns in the agent’s choices are robust, i.e., continue to hold in contexts outside Ko.
Theorem 2 Given a reason-based explanationR of the observed choice functionCo,
(a) the cautious predictor is accurate (i.e., coincides with the true choice function C on
its domain) if the true choice function C can be explained by some reasons structure;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor is accurate if the true choice function C can be ex-
plained by a reasons structure that is an extension of R; and
25By Proposition 2, the definition of M 0(K) does not depend on the choice of Ko.
26The three predictors could be extended further in analogy to the second route we mentioned for
predictions based on preference relations alone: we could drop the requirement that any context K in D
must o↵er the same feasible property bundles (in the cautious case) or options-as-perceived (in the other
cases) as some context in Ko. The maximal generalization would replace clause (ii) in the definition of
the courageous predictor with the requirement that {xK : x 2 K} has a  -greatest element.
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(c) the courageous predictor is accurate if the true choice function C can be explained
by a reasons structure that is an extension of R with the same causally relevant
context properties.
Informally, part (a) shows that cautious predictions are accurate if the agent’s choices
are robustly reason-based, i.e., reason-based not just in the observed domain Ko but also
in the entire domain K. This seems plausible for agents with reasonably stable choice
dispositions. Part (b) shows that semi-courageous predictions are accurate if the reasons
structure R that explains the agent’s observed choices does so robustly: it not only fits
the observed choices, but can be extended so as to explain the agent’s not-yet-observed
choices too. This requires that the reasons structure for the observed domain Ko be a
portion of a reasons structure for the entire domain K. Part (c) shows that courageous
predictions are accurate if the reasons structure R explains the agent’s choices robustly
in an even stronger sense: its extension to new contexts requires no additional causally
relevant context properties. So, the reasons structure for Ko must be a portion of a
reasons structure for K that already identifies all causally relevant context properties.
Whether these robustness assumptions are justified depends, in part, on how rich
the domain Ko of observed contexts is relative to the target domain K. Let us explain
this in relation to our three-part theorem:
(a) If the observed domain Ko is small, then reason-based explicability of the agent’s
choices in Ko is only limited evidence for reason-based explicability in the larger do-
main K. The smaller Ko is, the less demanding reason-based explicability becomes,
and the less it tells us about choices in K. By contrast, if Ko contains a large and
representative mix of contexts – e.g., a sizeable “random sample” of contexts from
K – then reason-basedness in Ko may be good evidence for reason-basedness in K.
(b) Even if the agent’s choices are robustly reason-based, the reasons structure for
Ko need not be a portion of a reasons structure for K. The set M(K) specified for
some observed context K may leave out some property that is needed to explain the
agent’s choice in some new contextK 0 with P(K 0) = P(K). If so, a reasons structure
for K could not be an extension of the reasons structure for Ko, since it would have
to specify the same M(K 0) = M(K) for all contexts K 0 with P(K 0) = P(K). The
larger and more representative Ko is, the less likely this problem is to occur.
(c) Similar remarks apply to the question of whether the reasons structure for Ko (even
when extendible to one for K) is likely to pick out all context properties that are
causally relevant in K. For example, if Ko contains no choice contexts o↵ering
37
luxury goods, then a reasons structure for Ko cannot identify the di↵erence that
“o↵ering luxury goods” might make to the agent’s motivation in contexts with that
property. A “representative” observed domain Ko reduces the risk of not identifying
some context properties that are causally relevant in the target domain K.
8 Concluding remarks
We have argued that reason-based explanations can make sense of a variety of non-
classical choice behaviours in a unified manner and clarify the di↵erence between
“bounded” and “sophisticated” deviations from classical rationality. Unlike classical
rationalizations of choices by preference relations, reason-based explanations enable us
to explain, and not only to represent, choices, by identifying the agent’s motivating rea-
sons. And finally, they allow us to predict an agent’s choices in genuinely novel contexts,
where no observations have been made. Crucially, di↵erent reason-based explanations of
the same choice behaviour are not equivalent, since some are typically more likely than
others to extend robustly to new choice contexts and thus to lead to accurate predictions
of future choices.
Such robustness is related to psychological adequacy. A psychologically ungrounded
explanation of an agent’s observed choices is more likely to fail in novel contexts, be-
cause it matches the observations by coincidence rather than for systematic reasons that
continue to apply in novel contexts. Psychological adequacy thus matters for the sake
of predictive accuracy, regardless of whether it matters for its own sake.
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A Further characterization results
We have seen that a choice function C : K ! 2X admits a reason-based explanation if
and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and therefore 2). But under what conditions does
a choice function admit a reason-based explanation with only one, or none, of the two
kinds of context-dependence we have distinguished? In answer to this question, we first
discuss the case of reason-based explanation without any context-dependence. We then
turn to the case of possibly context-related, but not context-variant motivation. And we
finally address the case of possibly context-variant, but not context-related motivation.
A.1 Reason-based explanation without any context-dependence
To characterize all choice functions that admit a reason-based explanation without any
context-dependence, we modify each of our three axioms. We replace Axioms 1 and 2
with variants referring only to option properties:
Axiom 1* For all contexts K 2 K and all options x, y 2 K, if P(x) = P(y), then
x 2 C(K), y 2 C(K).
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Axiom 2* For all contexts K,K 0 2 K, if {P(x) : x 2 K} = {P(x) : x 2 K 0}, then
{P(x) : x 2 C(K)} = {P(x) : x 2 C(K 0)}.
In our example, Bon-vivant Bonnie, who is “classically rational”, satisfies both of
these axioms. Chocoholic Coco satisfies Axiom 1* but violates Axiom 2* (to see this,
suppose K contains a chocolate-covered pear while K 0 does not); and Polite Pauline and
Weak-willed William violate even Axiom 1* (they care about a relational property).
We replace Axiom 3 with Richter’s (1971) original axiom of Revelation Coherence,
as introduced in Section 2, simply extended to the framework where contexts can be
defined more broadly than feasible sets.
Axiom 3* For all contexts K 2 K and any feasible option x 2 K, if, for every option
y 2 K, there is a context K 0 2 K in which x is chosen weakly over y, then x 2 C(K).
To state our theorem, call the set of contexts K closed under cloning if K is closed
under transforming any context by adding “clones” of feasible options; formally, when-
ever a context K 2 K contains an option x such that P(x) = P(x0) for some other option
x0 2 X (a clone of x), there is a context K 0 2 K such that K 0 = K [ {x0}.27
Theorem 3 Given a set of contexts K that is closed under cloning, a choice function
C admits a reason-based explanation with context-invariant and context-unrelated moti-
vation if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*.
A.2 Reason-based explanation with context-invariant motivation
We next characterize all choice functions that admit a reason-based explanation with
at most one kind of context-dependence. We begin with the case of possibly context-
related but not context-variant motivation. Surprisingly, the axioms characterizing this
case are the same as those for reason-based explanation simpliciter. Thus, any choice be-
haviour that admits a reason-based explanation simpliciter also admits one with context-
invariant motivation. Although this may seem to suggest that the restriction to context-
invariance has no choice-behaviourial implications, this conclusion would be wrong: the
restriction to context-invariance can a↵ect the prediction of choices in novel contexts.
27This is a weak condition. It holds vacuously if no distinct options in X have the same properties (i.e.,
if, for any x, x0 2 X, x 6= x0 implies P(x) 6= P(x0)). It is also natural because if an option x0 is property-
wise indistinguishable from a currently feasible option x, one would expect that x0 can become feasible
too. Presumably, if x, but not x0, can be feasible (together with some other options), this di↵erence
stems from x and x0 having di↵erent properties. We could further weaken or modify the condition, e.g.,
by replacing “K0 = K [ {x0}” with “K0 = (K\{x : P(x) = P(x0)}) [ {x0}”, so that x0 is not added but
substituted for the existing feasible options that are property-wise indistinguishable from it.
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Before stating the present result formally, let us give an illustration. As we have
seen, Chocoholic Coco can be explained – quite intuitively – by the attribution of a
reasons structure with context-variant motivation. But a less intuitive explanation is also
possible. It ascribes context-invariant motivation to Coco, at the expense of making this
motivation context-related. This invokes the following reasons structure R = (M, ):
• M assigns to each context the same set of motivationally salient properties M =
{big, medium, small, chocolate-o↵ering}, instead of letting motivationally salient
properties vary with the presence or absence of chocolate;
•   places any property bundles that do not contain the property “chocolate-o↵ering”
in the same indi↵erence class (e.g., {big} ⌘ {small}), and ranks property bundles
by “fruit size” when they contain one of the size properties together with the prop-
erty “chocolate-o↵ering” (i.e., {big, chocolate-o↵ering} > {medium, chocolate-
o↵ering} > {small, chocolate-o↵ering}).
Generally, two reasons structures R and R0 are behaviourally equivalent if they induce
the same (possibly improper) choice function, i.e., if CR = CR0 .
Proposition 3 Every reasons structure is behaviourally equivalent to one with context-
invariant motivation.
Corollary 1 A choice function C admits a reason-based explanation with context-
invariant motivation if and only if it admits a reason-based rationalization simpliciter.
As a consequence of Proposition 3, Theorem 1 can be re-stated as a characterization
of context-invariant reason-based choice:
Theorem 4 A choice function C admits a reason-based explanation with context-
invariant motivation if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1 and 3 (and therefore 2).
Of course, the possibility of re-expressing any reason-based explanation in a context-
invariant way disappears once we impose further requirements on the attributed reasons
structure R, such as the requirement that motivation be context-unrelated and that it
satisfy other simplicity requirements.28
28Even when such a context-invariant explanation is possible, it may sacrifice parsimony and psycholog-
ical adequacy, as evident from the proof of Proposition 3. Here, every property that was motivationally
salient in some context in the original, context-variant reasons structure (M, ) and every context prop-
erty (at least every context property on which M(K) may depend) becomes motivationally salient in
the new, context-invariant reasons structure (M⇤, ⇤). Formally, ([K2KM(K)) [ Pcontext ✓M⇤.
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A.3 Reason-based explanation with context-unrelated motivation
We finally characterize all choice functions that admit a reason-based explanation with
context-unrelated, but possibly context-variant motivation. To state this characteriza-
tion, we need to introduce the notion of revealed motivational salience. Informally, a
property P is revealed motivationally salient for an agent in context K if its presence
or absence in an option makes a di↵erence to the agent’s choices in contexts “like” K,
namely in contexts that have the same context properties as K. Choices in contexts with
di↵erent context properties are irrelevant, since they could stem from di↵erent motiva-
tionally salient properties. The choice of moisturizer over sunscreen in a cloudy context
is no evidence for whether “protecting against UV radiation” is motivationally salient
in a sunny context. (Our invariance constraint only requires contexts with the same
context properties to give rise to the same motivationally salient properties.)
Formally, for each context K, let KK denote the set of all contexts K 0 in K such that
P(K 0) = P(K). Property P is revealed motivationally salient in context K if there are
two pairs of property bundles (S, T ) and (S0, T 0), where (S0, T 0) arises from (S, T ) by
adding or removing P in one of the bundles, such that
(i) S is chosen in some context K 0 2 KK where only the property bundles S and T are
feasible, and
(ii) S0 is not chosen in some context K 00 2 KK where only the property bundles S0 and
T 0 are feasible.
For instance, we could have S = T = S0 = {P,Q} and T 0 = {Q}; here property P has
been removed from bundle T .
The present definition of revealed motivational salience is intended only for special
domains of contexts (so called “diverse” domains, as defined below). For general K, the
definition is inappropriate, because a general K need not contain the sorts of contexts
used in our definition, i.e., contexts with only two feasible property bundles. The general
definition goes beyond the scope of this paper.
We now introduce a weaker version of Axiom 2* with an additional motivational-
salience clause.
Axiom 2** For all contexts K,K 0 2 K, if {P(x) : x 2 K} = {P(x) : x 2 K 0} and all
option properties of options inK (and hence of options inK 0) are revealed motivationally
salient in both contexts, then {P(x) : x 2 C(K)} = {P(x) : x 2 C(K 0)}.
Loosely speaking, this axiom says that if two contexts o↵er the same feasible combi-
nations of option properties and if all those option properties are revealed motivationally
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salient, then the agent chooses options that instantiate the same option properties in the
two contexts. This immediately suggests context-unrelated motivation, since context-
related properties are treated as irrelevant. But the agent’s motivation could still be
context-variant, since di↵erent option properties might be revealed motivationally salient
in di↵erent contexts.29
We call the set K of contexts diverse if it is closed under removing feasible property
bundles or option properties, as follows: whenever K contains a context in which property
bundles S and T are feasible, and O is a set of option properties, then K also contains
a context in which only the reduced property bundles S\O and T\O are feasible. This
condition can be decomposed into the conjunction of two conditions: (i) closure under
removing feasible bundles (the special case where O = ?) and (ii) closure under removing
option properties (the special case where the original context o↵ers only two feasible
bundles S and T ).30
Theorem 5 Suppose the set of contexts K is diverse (and each option x in X has finitely
many option properties). A choice function C admits a reason-based explanation with
context-unrelated motvation if and only if it satisfies Axioms 1*, 2**, and 3.
Which reasons structure with context-unrelated motivation explains the agent’s
choices under Axioms 1*, 2**, and 3 here? The most natural candidate, used also
in our proof, is the revealed reasons structure. This is constructed directly from the
choice function C and denoted RC = (MC , C). Specifically, MC(K) is defined as the
set of revealed motivationally salient properties in context K, and S  C T is defined
as meaning that, in some context, an option perceived as S is chosen while an option
perceived as T is feasible.
29It might not be obvious that Axiom 2** permits a reasons structureR = (M, ) with context-variant
(but context-unrelated) motivation. Could the required coherence between the choices in contexts K
and K0 fail if M(K) 6= M(K0)? As shown later, the clause “all option properties [...] are revealed
motivationally salient in both contexts” guarantees that P(x) ✓M(K) for all x 2 K and P(x) ✓M(K0)
for all x 2 K0. So, for each x in K, we have xK = P(x), and for each x in K0, we have xK0 = P(x) (only
option properties are motivationally salient, given context-unrelated motivation). Thus, any di↵erence in
motivation between the two contexts would not translate into a di↵erence in how options are perceived.
30These definitions permit S = T . Diversity is a loss of generality, since in practice it can easily be
violated. For an example where (i) is violated, suppose the original context which o↵ers the bundles S
and T has the context property that more than two property bundles are on o↵er, so that S and T each
contain this context property. Then no context can coherently o↵er only S and T . For an example where
(ii) fails, suppose the original context which o↵ers S and T has the context property of o↵ering only
expensive options, so that S and T each contain this context property as well as the option property
“expensive”. Then removing this option property from S and T leads to two bundles which cannot be
feasible in any context, since no context could o↵er only expensive options and also non-expensive ones.
45
B Proofs
This appendix contains all proofs. In Appendix B.1, we prove the results on the explan-
ation of choices (stated in Section 5 and Appendix A). In Appendix B.2, we turn to the
results on the prediction of novel choices (stated in Section 7).
Notation. Recall that a reasons structure R = (M;") induces, for every context K in
the domain of M ,
# options-as-perceived, deÖned by xK = P(x;K) \M(K) (for x 2 X) and
# a context-speciÖc preference relation %K on X, deÖned by x %K y , xK " yK .
We sometimes write xRK for xK and %RK for %K to make the reasons structure in question
explicit. We also often write MK as an abbreviation for M(K). Recall further that, for
property bundles S; T ( P, S %C T means that S is revealed weakly preferred to T ; we
also write S %-C T to mean that S and T are revealed comparable, i.e., that S %C T
or T %C S.
B.1 The results on reason-based explanation
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume Axiom 3. As in Axiom 2, consider contexts K;K 0 2 K such
that (*) fP(y;K) : y 2 Kg = fP(y0;K 0) : y0 2 K 0g. We only show that fP(x;K) :
x 2 C(K)g ( fP(x0;K 0) : x0 2 C(K 0)g, since the converse inclusion (ë,í) is analogous.
Suppose x 2 C(K). The property bundle P(x;K) is feasible in context K, hence by
(*) also in context K 0. It is revealed weakly preferred to all feasible property bundles
in context K, hence by (*) also to all feasible property bundles in context K 0. So, by
Axiom 3, it is chosen in context K 0, i.e., belongs to fP(x0;K 0) : x0 2 C(K 0)g. #
We give no separate proof of Theorem 1, since this result follows from Proposition 3 and
Theorem 4, both of which we shall prove.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let K be closed under cloning (which we only need in Step 2).
Step 1. Assume C is rationalized by a reasons structure with context-invariant and
context-unrelated motivation, R = (M;"), where M ( Poption. We leave the proof of
Axioms 1* and 2* to the reader and now prove Axiom 3*. It su¢ces to show that C is
rationalizable in the classical sense by a binary relation on X (see Remark 2). Since R
explains C, the choice set C(K) for a context K consists of the %K-best option(s) in K,
where %K is the preference relation on X induced by the reasons structure R for context
K. Given the structureís context-independence (in both senses), options as perceived
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do not depend on the context (see Section 2.5), and so %K does not depend on K; we
can write it as %. Therefore the choice function C is rationalizable in the classical sense
by a binary relation (i.e., %).
Step 2. Now assume Axioms 1*, 2* and 3*. Let%! be the classical revealed preference
relation on X (so ëx %! yí means x is chosen weakly over y in some context). We prove
that C is reason-based explicable by (for instance) the following reasons structure with
context-invariant and context-unrelated motivation R = (M;"):
# M is the set Poption of all option properties.
# For all property bundles S; T % P, ëS " T í means that x %! y for some options
x; y 2 X such that P(x) = S and P(y) = T .
Under this reasons structure, options are perceived as follows:
xK = P(x;K) \M = P(x) for all x 2 X and K 2 K. (2)
Clearly, these options-as-perceived do not depend on the context, and so the induced
preference relation % (= %K) on X also does not depend on the context K.
Let %!! be the binary relation deÖned as
x %!! y , [x %! y or P(x) = P(y)] for all x; y 2 X.
We have to prove that C = CR. This follows from three facts:
(i) CR is (classically) rationalizable by %;
(ii) C is (classically) rationalizable by %! and by %!! (and thus, by any relation %0
such that %! % %0 % %!!);
(iii) %! % % % %!!.
Fact (i): This holds by deÖnition of CR.
Fact (ii): By Remark 2, Axiom 3* implies that C is rationalizable by some binary
relation. One such relation (in fact, the minimal one) is the classical revealed preference
relation %!, as is easily checked and well-known (see Richter 1971). Also, %!! rationalizes
C, which can be shown as follows. Fix a context K. We have to show that
C(K) = fx 2 K : x %!! y for all y 2 Kg:
Since %!! extends %!, C(K) % fx 2 K : x %!! y for all y 2 Kg. Conversely, suppose
x 2 K such that x %!! y for all y 2 K. We show that x 2 C(K). If P(z) = P(x) for
all z 2 K, then C(K) = K by Axiom 1* and the fact that C(K) 6= ?. Thus x 2 C(K),
as required. Now let z 2 K such that P(z) 6= P(x). Consider any y 2 K. We have to
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show that x %! y. If P(y) 6= P(x), this holds by the deÖnition of %!! and the fact that
x %!! y. Now suppose P(y) = P(x). Note that x %! z (since x %!! z and P(z) 6= P(x)).
So, there is a context eK 2 K such that x 2 C( eK). Since P(y) = P(x) and since K is
closed under cloning, there is a context K 0 2 K such that K 0 = eK [ fyg. By Axiom 2*
and the fact that fP(v) : v 2 eKg = fP(v) : v 2 K 0g and x 2 C( eK), we have v 2 C(K 0)
for some v 2 K 0 such that P(v) = P(x). So, by Axiom 1*, x 2 C(K 0). As x 2 C(K 0)
and y 2 K 0, we have x %! y, as required.
Fact (iii): Consider any x; y 2 X. We have to show that
[x %! y ) x % y] and [x % y ) x %!! y].
Given that the options-as-perceived take the form (2), we have x % y , P(x) * P(y).
Therefore, we have to prove that
[x %! y ) P(x) * P(y)] and [P(x) * P(y)) x %!! y].
The Örst of these two implications holds by deÖnition of *. As for the second implication,
we suppose P(x) * P(y) and claim that x %!! y. If P(x) = P(y), the claim holds by
deÖnition of %!!. From now on, suppose P(x) 6= P(y). As P(x) * P(y), there exist
x0; y0 2 X such that P(x0) = P(x), P(y0) = P(y), and x0 %! y0. Since x0 %! y0, there is
a context K 2 K such that x0 2 C(K) and y0 2 K. Relying twice on the fact that K is
closed under cloning, we can choose a context K 0 2 K such that K 0 = K [ fx; yg. By
Axiom 2* and the fact that fP(z) : z 2 Kg = fP(z) : z 2 K 0g and x0 2 C(K), we have
v 2 C(K 0) for some v 2 K 0 such that P(v) = P(x0). So, by Axiom 1*, x 2 C(K 0). As
x 2 C(K 0) and y 2 K 0, we have x %! y. So x %!! y, as required. "
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider any reasons structure R = (M;*). DeÖne a reasons
structure with context-invariant motivation R0 = (M 0;*0) as follows:
, M 0 is any property set such that M 0 - [K2K(MK [ P(K)) (= ([K2KMK) [
Pcontext), for instance M 0 = P;
, for any property bundles S; T . P, we tale ëS *0 T í to mean that there exists a
contextK 2 K such that P(K) = S\Pcontext = T \Pcontext and S\MK * T \MK .
We prove that CR = CR0 . Consider an arbitrary context K 2 K; we have to
show that CR(K) = CR0(K). We do so by proving that R and R0 induce the same
preference relation on X in context K. Fix options x; y 2 X. We have to show that
x %RK y , x %R
0
K y, i.e., writing S = P(x;K) and T = P(y;X), that
S \MK * T \MK , S \M 0 *0 T \M 0.
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We will draw on the fact that (*) P(K) = S \ Pcontext = T \ Pcontext.
ë)í: If S \MK $ T \MK , then S $0 T by (*) and the deÖnition of $0; and hence,
S \M 0 $0 T \M 0.
ë(í: Now let S \M 0 $0 T \M 0. By deÖnition of $0, there is a context K 0 2 K such
that P(K 0) = S \ Pcontext = T \ Pcontext and (S \M 0) \MK0 $ (T \M 0) \MK0 . We
deduce two facts. First, P(K 0) = P(K), where we use (*). Second, S \MK0 $ T \MK0 ,
using the fact that MK0 ( M 0. The Örst fact implies that MK0 = MK (by deÖnition of
a reasons structure). This and the second fact jointly imply that S \MK $ T \MK , as
required. !
Before proving Theorem 4, we Örst show that Axioms 1 and 3 can be jointly summarized
in the following axiom:
Axiom 3+. For any option x in any context K 2 K, if the property bundle P(x;K) is
revealed weakly preferred to P(y;K) for all options y in K, then x 2 C(K).
Lemma 2 Axioms 1 and 3 are jointly equivalent to Axiom 3+.
Proof. ë(í: First assume Axioms 1 and 3. As in Axiom 3+, let K 2 K and x 2 K such
that P(x;K) %C P(y;K) for all y 2 K. By Axiom 3, P(x;K) is chosen in context K.
So, C(K) contains some x0 such that P(x0;K) = P(x;K). Thus x 2 C(K) by Axiom 1.
ë)í: Now assume Axiom 3+. Axiom 3 is obvious. As for Axiom 1, let K 2 K and
x; y 2 K such that P(x;K) = P(y;K). We only show that x 2 C(K)) y 2 C(K); the
converse implication is analogous. Let x 2 C(K). Then the property bundle P(x;K) is
revealed weakly preferred to each feasible property bundle in context K. The same is
thus true of the property bundle P(y;K) (= P(x;K)). So y 2 C(K) by Axiom 3+. !
Proof of Theorem 4. Step 1. Suppose that a reasons structure with context-invariant
motivation, (M;$), explains C. We have to prove Axioms 1 and 3. It su¢ces to show
Axiom 3+ by Lemma 2. As in Axiom 3+, consider a context K 2 K and an option
x 2 K such that P(x;K) %C P(y;K) for each y 2 K. We must show that x 2 C(K),
i.e., since (M;$) explains C, that
P(x;K) \M $ P(y;K) \M (3)
for all y 2 K. Consider any y 2 K. Since P(x;K) %C P(y;K), there exist K 0 2 K and
x0; y0 2 K 0 (which may depend on y) such that (i) P(x0;K 0) = P(x;K) and P(y0;K 0) =
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P(y;K), and (ii) C(K 0) = x0. Given (ii) and the fact that (M;") explains C, we have
P(x0;K 0) \M " P(y0;K 0) \M:
By (i), this implies (3), as required.
Step 2. Now assume Axioms 1 and 3. We show that C is explicable for instance by
the (very special) reasons structure with context-invariant motivation (M;") = (P;%C),
for which (i) all properties are always motivationally salient, and (ii) " is the relation
of revealed weak preference. To show this, let K 2 K and x 2 K. We must show that
x 2 C(K) , [P(x;K) \M " P(y;K) \M for all y 2 K],
or equivalently, given our special deÖnitions of M and ", that
x 2 C(K) , [P(x;K) %C P(y;K) for all y 2 K].
The right-hand side of this equivalence implies that x 2 C(K) by Axiom 3+, where this
axiom holds by Lemma 2. Conversely, if x 2 C(K), then the right-hand side holds by
the deÖnition of the revealed preference relation %C . "
The proof of Theorem 5 rests on three key lemmas. They draw on the revealed
reasons structure (MC ;"C) deÖned in Appendix A.
Lemma 3 Assume K is diverse. If a choice function on K is explicable by a reasons
structure (M;"), then MC(K) 'M(K) for all contexts K 2 K.
Proof. Assume K is diverse and (M;") explains C. Suppose K 2 K and P 2 MCK . We
show that P 2 MK . Since P 2 MCK , we can pick a pair of bundles (S; T ) and another
pair (S0; T 0) arising from (S; T ) by adding or removing P in one bundle such that
( in a context K" 2 K with P(K") = P(K), S is chosen and only S and T are
feasible; hence, S \MK! " T \MK! ;
( in a context K"" with P(K"") = P(K), S0 is not chosen and only S0 and T 0 are
feasible; hence, S0 \MK!! 6" U \MK!! for some U 2 fS0; T 0g.
Further, as K is diverse,
( in a context K""" with P(K""") = P(K), S0 is the only feasible bundle2 (and is
thus chosen); hence, S0 \MK!!! " S0 \MK!!! .
2Here we apply the deÖnition of diversity to the case of two identical bundles.
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Since P(K!) = P(K!!) = P(K!!!) = P(K), we have MK! =MK!! =MK!!! =MK . So
the three bullet points imply that
S \MK # T \MK and S0 \MK 6# T 0 \MK :
This is only possible if
S \MK 6= S0 \MK or T \MK 6= T 0 \MK :
In each of these two cases, P must belong toMK . !
Lemma 4 Assume K is diverse (and jP(x)j < 1 for all x 2 X). If Axioms 1* and
2** hold, then MCK ) Poption for all K 2 K, i.e., the revealed reasons structure has
context-unrelated motivation.
Proof. Assume K is diverse and jP(x)j <1 for all x 2 X. For transparency, the axioms
will be added only where needed. Let K 2 K, and assume for a contradiction that
P 2MCKnPoption. As P 2MCK , we can choose a pair of bundles (S; T ) and another pair
(S0; T 0) arising from (S; T ) by adding or removing P in one bundle such that
(*) in a context K! 2 K with P(K!) = P(K), only S and T are feasible and S is
chosen,
(**) in a context K!! with P(K!!) = P(K), only S0 and T 0 are feasible and S0 is not
chosen.
Claim 1: There exist
+ a context K+ in which only the bundles Sn(PoptionnMCK) and Tn(PoptionnMCK) are
feasible and the former bundle is chosen, and
+ a context K# in which only the bundles S0n(PoptionnMCK) and T 0n(PoptionnMCK)
are feasible and the former bundle is not chosen.
Let P1; :::; Pm (m 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g) be all the option properties in S or T which are not
revealed motivationally salient. There are only Önitely many such properties because
the set of these option properties is (S[T )\PoptionnMCK , which is included in the union
of the Önite sets S \ Poption and T \ Poption. As K is diverse, it contains a context
in which only the bundles SnfP1g and TnfP1g are feasible; in that context SnfP1g is
chosen by (*) and the fact that P1 62 MCK .3 Next, by an analogous argument, there
3To be precise, if P1 belongs to both S and T , then the more detailed argument goes in two steps and
consists in removing P1 Örst from one of the bundles (say from S, which transforms the pair (S; T ) into
(SnfP1g; T )) and then from the other bundle (which transforms (SnfP1g; T ) into (SnfP1g; TnfP1g)).
This amounts to two applications of the diversity of K and the fact that P1 62MCK .
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is a context in which only the bundles SnfP1; P2g and TnfP1; P2g are feasible and in
which SnfP1; P2g is chosen. After m such property-removal steps, we reach a context
in which only SnfP1; :::; Pmg = Sn(PoptionnMCK) and TnfP1; :::; Pmg = Tn(PoptionnMCK)
are feasible and the former bundle is chosen. This proves the claim within the Örst bullet
point. The claim within the second bullet point is proved by a similar property-removal
argument, but using (**) instead of (*). This completes the proof of Claim 1.
In what follows, K+ and K! are contexts as in Claim 1.
Claim 2: Under Axiom 2**, fP(x) : x 2 C(K+)g = fP(x) : x 2 C(K!)g.
This claim holds as the contexts K+ and K! satisfy the two premises of Axiom 2**:
& Firstly, fP(x) : x 2 K+g = fP(x) : x 2 K!g, because the set on the left equals
fS\Poption\MCK ; T \Poption\MCKg while the set on the right equals fS0\Poption\
MCK ; T
0\Poption \MCKg, where these two sets are identical since by P 62 Poption we
have S \ Poption = S0 \ Poption and T \ Poption = T 0 \ Poption.
& Secondly, for any option x inK+ or inK!, we have P(x) )MCK (as is clear from the
previous bullet point), where we have MCK = M
C
K+
(as P(K+) = P(K#) = P(K))
and MCK =M
C
K! (as P(K!) = P(K##) = P(K)).
Claim 3: The bundle S \ Poption \MCK belongs to fP(x) : x 2 C(K+)g, but under
Axiom 1* not to fP(x) : x 2 C(K!)g (this contradicts Claim 2, completing the proof).
By Claim 1, the bundle Sn(PoptionnMCK) belongs to fP(x;K+) : x 2 C(K+g, and
so its intersection with Poption belongs to fP(x) : x 2 C(K+g. This intersection is
precisely S \ Poption \MCK . Again by Claim 1, the bundle S0n(PoptionnMCK) belongs to
fP(x;K!) : x 2 K!nC(K!)g, and so its intersection with Poption belongs to fP(x) : x 2
K!nC(K!)g, this intersection being S0 \ Poption \MCK = S \ Poption \MCK . Assuming
Axiom 1*, the set fP(x) : x 2 K!nC(K!)g has no member in common with the set
fP(x) : x 2 C(K!)g, and so the latter set cannot also contain S \ Poption \MCK . !
Lemma 5 Assume K is diverse (and jP(x)j < 1 for all x 2 X). Suppose Axioms 1*,
2**, and 3 hold. For all contexts K;K 0 2 K and all options x; y 2 K and x0; y0 2 K 0, if
we have xK = x0K0 and yK = y
0
K0 relative to the revealed reasons structure, then
P(x;K) %C P(y;K), P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0):
Proof. Let K be diverse and jP(x)j < 1 for all x 2 X. Consider K;K 0 2 K, x; y 2
K and x0; y0 2 K 0. For transparency, we will again add axioms only where they are
needed. Consider the revealed reasons structure (M;.) = (MC ;.C). (We do of course
not assume that it explains the choice function C, although it does so under Axioms
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1*, 2**, and 3 by Theorem 5, which will ultimately be proved.) Suppose xK = x0K0
and yK = y0K0 . As K is diverse, it contains a context L in which only the bundles
P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK) and P(y;K)n(PoptionnMK) are feasible, and a context L0 in which
only the bundles P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0) and P(y0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0) are feasible. We
now show three claims, where Claims 1 and 3 immediately imply the desired equivalence
between P(x;K) %C P(y;K) and P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0).
Claim 1: Under Axiom 3, P(x;K) %C P(y;K) if and only if P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK)
is chosen in context L, and P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0) if and only if P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0)
is chosen in context L0.
Suppose Axiom 3. We only show the Örst equivalence, as the second one holds
analogously. There exist only Önitely many option properties which are in P(x;K) or
P(y;K) but outside MK , because the set of these properties is (P(x) [ P(y))nMK ,
where jP(x)j ; jP(y)j < 1. Let P1; :::; Pm (m ' 0) be these properties. As K is di-
verse, it contains, for each t 2 f0; 1; :::;mg, a context Kt in which only the two bundles
P(x;K)nfP1; :::; Ptg and P(y;K)nfP1; :::; Ptg are feasible. Since
P(x;K)nfP1; :::; Pmg = P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK)
P(y;K)nfP1; :::; Pmg = P(y;K)n(PoptionnMK);
we may assume that Km was chosen such that Km = L, and it su¢ces to show that
P(x;K) %C P(y;K) if and only if P(x;K)nfP1; :::; Pmg is chosen in context Km. This
is done by the following argument (which implicitly uses the fact that any context Kt
has the same revealed motivationally salient properties as K, i.e., M(Kt) = MK):4
P(x;K) %C P(y;K)
, P(x;K) is chosen in K0 by Axiom 3
, P(x;K)nfP1g is chosen in K1 as P1 isnít revealed mot. sal. in K1
, P(x;K)nfP1; P2g is chosen in K2 as P2 isnít revealed mot. sal. in K2
etc.
, P(x;K)nfP1; :::; Pmg is chosen in Km as Pm isnít revealed mot. sal. in Km.
Claim 2: Under Axioms 2**, fP(z) : z 2 C(L)g = fP(z) : z 2 C(L0)g.
Assume Axiom 2**. It su¢ces to show that both premises of the axiom (applied
to the contexts L and L0) hold. Note Örst that the set fP(z; L) : z 2 Lg consists of
the bundles P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK) and P(y;K)n(PoptionnMK)g. When intersected with
4 In each of these equivalences except the Örst one, the argument may be divided into two steps, for
reasons analogous to those discussed in footnote 3.
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Poption, these two bundles become
P(x;K) \MK \ Poption = P(x;K) \MK = xK
and P(y;K) \MK \ Poption = P(y;K) \MK = yK ,
where the middle equality on both lines holds becauseMK # Poption by Lemma 4. Since
fP(z) : x 2 Lg consists precisely of the intersections of a bundle in fP(z; L) : z 2 Lg
with Poption, we have fP(z) : z 2 Lg = fxK ; yKg. By an analogous argument, fP(z) :
z 2 L0g = fx0K0 ; y0K0g. Since, by assumption xK = x0K0 and yK = y0K0 , it follows that
fP(z) : z 2 Lg = fP(z) : z 2 L0g. This identity is the Örst premise of Axiom 2** applied
to the contexts L and L0. The axiomís second premise also holds, since
' for each z in L, any property in P(z) belongs to xK or yK , so to MK =ML; and
' for each z in L0, any property in P(z) belongs to x0K0 or y0K0 , so to MK0 =ML0 .
Claim 3: Under Axioms 1* and 2**, P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK) is chosen in context L
if and only if P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0) is chosen in context L0.
Suppose Axioms 1* and 2** hold. We assume that P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK) is chosen
in context L and show that P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0) is chosen in context L0 (the converse
implication has an analogous proof). Since the bundle P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0) belongs
to fP(z; L0) : z 2 L0g, we can pick a z0 2 L0 such that P(z0; L0) = P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0).
Note that
P(z0) = P(z0; L0) \ Poption = P(x0;K 0) \ Poption \MK0
= P(x0;K 0) \MK0 = x0K0 = xK ;
where the third equality holds because MK0 # Poption by Lemma 4. Meanwhile, since
the bundle P(x;K)n(PoptionnMK) belongs to fP(z; L) : z 2 C(L)g, its intersection with
Poption belongs to fP(z) : z 2 C(L)g. By the proof of Claim 2, that intersection is
xK , so that xK 2 fP(z) : z 2 C(L)g. By Claim 2 and the fact that xK = P(z0), it
follows that P(z0) 2 fP(z) : z 2 C(L0)g. So z 2 C(L0) for some, and hence by Axiom
1* every z 2 L0 such that P(z) = P(z0). In particular, z0 2 C(L0). Hence the bundle
P(z0; L0) = P(x0;K 0)n(PoptionnMK0) is chosen in context L0, as desired. !
Proof of Theorem 5. Assume K is diverse and jP(x)j <1 for all x 2 X. We prove Örst
the axiomsí necessity (Step 1) and then their su¢ciency (Step 2).
Step 1. Suppose C has a reason-based explanation with context-unrelated motivation
(M;,). Axiom 3 holds by Theorem 1. To see why Axioms 1* holds, note that, for all
K 2 K and x; y 2 K, P(x) = P(y)) xK = yK because MK # Poption.
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To show that Axiom 2** holds, we consider contexts K;K 0 2 K such that (*) fP(x) :
x 2 Kg = fP(x) : x 2 K 0g and (**) P(x) & MCK ;MCK0 for all x in K or K 0. We Örst
show that
xK = P(x) for all x 2 K and xK0 = P(x) for all x 2 K 0. (4)
The Örst part of (4) holds since, for any x 2 K,
xK = P(x;K) \MK by deÖnition of xK
= P(x;K) \ Poption \MK as MK & Poption
= P(x) \MK as P(x) = P(x;K) \ Poption
= P(x) as P(x) &MCK &MK ;
where the last-mentioned inclusion ëMCK &MK í holds by Lemma 3. The second part of
(4) holds for analogous reasons.
It is now easy to see why fP(y) : y 2 C(K)g = fP(y0) : y0 2 C(K 0)g. Let us show
why the left side is included in the right side (the converse inclusion is analogous). We
thus consider a y 2 C(K) and show that P(y) 2 fP(y0) : y0 2 C(K 0)g. By (*), we can
pick a y0 2 K 0 such that P(y) = P(y0). It su¢ces to show that y0 2 C(K 0). This follows
from the fact that y 2 C(K) and the following equivalences:
y 2 C(K) , yK ) xK for all x 2 K as (M;)) explains C
, P(y) ) P(x) for all x 2 K by (4)
, P(y0) ) P(x) for all x 2 K 0 by P(y) = P(y0) and (*)
, y0K0 ) xK0 for all x 2 K 0 by (4)
, y0 2 C(K 0) as (M;)) explains C.
Step 2. Conversely, assume Axioms 1*, 2**, and 3. Let (M;)) be the revealed
reasons structure (MC ;)C) deÖned in Appendix A. Since this reasons structure has
context-unrelated motivation by Lemma 4, it su¢ces to show that it explains C. We
thus consider any K 2 K and x 2 K and have to show that
x 2 C(K), [xK ) yK for all y 2 K] .
First, if x 2 C(K), then, for all y 2 K, we have xK ) yK , by deÖnition of ) as )C
and by the fact that some option perceived as xK (namely x itself) is chosen in K while
some option perceived as yK (namely y itself) is feasible in K.
Conversely, assume that xK ) yK for all y 2 K. Consider any y 2 K. By deÖnition
of ), since xK ) yK , there is a context K 0 2 K in which some chosen option x0 2 C(K 0)
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is perceived as x0K0 = xK and some feasible option y
0 2 K 0 is perceived as y0K0 = yK .
Since x0 2 C(K 0) and y0 2 K 0, we have P(x0;K 0) %C P(y0;K 0). Since x0K0 = xK and
y0K0 = yK , it follows that P(x;K) %C P(y;K) by Lemma 5. As this is true for all y 2 K,
we have x 2 C(K), by Axiom 3+ (which holds by Lemma 2). "
B.2 The results on reason-based prediction
We now adopt our extended framework for predictions deÖned in Section 7. As men-
tioned in Section 7.2, we further assume that each context K 2 K has only Önitely many
context properties, i.e., jP(K)j <1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let R0 = (M 0;') be a reasons structure for a domain D ) K.
Regarding part (a), if all M 0K coincide, then obviously CAU
R0 = ?; and if CAUR0 = ?,
then part (b) will imply that all M 0K coincide. It thus remains to prove part (b). We
proceed by contraposition. Let K;K 0 2 D satisfy M 0K 6= M 0K0 . Since P(K) and P(K 0)
are Önite, the ëdisagreement setí P(K)4P(K 0) is Önite (for any two sets A and B, we
deÖne A 4 B as (AnB) [ (BnA)). So, as one easily checks, there is a Önite sequence
K1; :::;Kn 2 D with K1 = K, Kn = K 0 such that, for each m 2 f1; :::; n / 1g, the
contexts Km and Km+1 di§er minimally (in the sense of (cau3)). Since M 0K1 6= M 0Kn ,
there is an m 2 f1; :::; n / 1g such that M 0Km 6= M 0Km+1 . By deÖnition of reasons
structures, it follows that P(Km) 6= P(Km+1). Hence we may pick a context property
P 2 P(Km)4P(Km+1). It follows that P 2 P(K)4P(K 0). Hence, since we also have
P 2 CAUR0 (because the criteria (cau1)-(cau3) hold for the contexts Km and Km+1),
P 2 (P(K) \ CAUR0)4 (P(K 0) \ CAUR0). So P(K) \ CAUR0 6= P(K 0) \ CAUR0 . "
Proof of Remark 1. Consider an explanation R = (M;') of the observed choice function
Co. Let R1 = (M1;'), R2 = (M2;'), and R3 = (M3;') be the reasons structures
used to deÖne, respectively, the cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous predictors,
with corresponding domains D1, D2, and D3.
(a) CR1 extends Co, because R1 extends R (as a consequence of the deÖnition of
R1) and CR = Co (by assumption).
(b) We prove that CR2 extends CR1 by showing that R2 extends R1. Consider any
K 2 D1. We have to show that K 2 D2 and M1K = M2K . Since K 2 D1, there is an
L 2 Ko such that fP (x;K) : x 2 Kg = fP (x; L) : x 2 Lg. One easily veriÖes the
conditions (i) (by using the same context L) and (ii) (by using the context L0 := L ).
(c) It su¢ces to show that R3 extends R2. Let K 2 D2; so conditions (i) and (ii)
hold. We have to show that K 2 D3 and M2K = M3K . The former holds because (i)
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immediately implies (i*) (just use the same context L 2 Ko). Moreover, M2K = M3K
because each side equals ML for L as in (i). !
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider an explanationR = (M;$) of the observed choice function
Co. We use the notation from our proof of Remark 1. Further, for any reasons structure
R0, the set of feasible options as perceived in a context K (from the domain of R0) is
denoted KR0 := fxR0K : x 2 Kg.
(a) Suppose C is explicable by an arbitrary reasons structure R+ = (M+;$+).
Consider any K 2 D1 and x 2 K. We have to show that x 2 CR1(K), x 2 C(K). As
K 2 D1 we can pick an L 2 Ko such that
fP(y;K) : y 2 Kg = fP(y; L) : y 2 Lg: (5)
So KR1 = LR1 and KR+ = LR+ (though perhaps KR1 6= KR+). Now pick a z 2 L
such that P(x;K) = P(z; L) (which is possible by (5)). It follows that xR1K = zR
1
L and
xR+K = z
R+
L . We show the claimed equivalence by proving that each side holds if and
only if z 2 Co(L):
x 2 CR1(K) , xR1K $ S for all S 2 KR
1
by deÖnition of CR1
, zR1L $ S for all S 2 LR
1
as xR1K = z
R1
L and K
R1 = LR1
, z 2 CR1(L) by deÖnition of CR1
, z 2 Co(L) as CR1(L) = Co(L) by Remark 1,
x 2 C(K) , x 2 CR+(K) as CR+ = C
, xR+K $+ S for all S 2 KR
+
by deÖnition of CR+
, zR+L $+ S for all S 2 LR
+
as xR+K = z
R+
L and K
R+ = LR+
, z 2 CR+(L) by deÖnition of CR+
, z 2 Co(L) as CR+(L) = C(L) = Co(L).
(b) Now let C be explicable by an extension R+ = (M+;$) of R. Let K 2 D2 and
x 2 K. We show that x 2 CR2(K) , x 2 C(K). As K 2 D2 we can pick L;L0 2 Ko
such that P(L) = P(K) and (*) KR2 = (L0)R2 . By (*), we can choose a z 2 L0 such
that (**) xR2K = z
R2
L0 . Since M
+
L0 = M
2
L0 (= ML0),
(L0)R
+
= (L0)R
2
and zR
+
L0 = z
R2
L0 : (6)
Since M+L = M
2
L (= ML) and P(L) = P(K), we have M+K = M2K , and thus
KR
+
= KR
2
and xR
+
K = x
R2
K : (7)
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By (*), (**), (6), and (7), we have (***) KR+ = (L0)R+ and (****) xR+K = z
R+
L0 .
One can prove the claimed equivalence by proving that each side holds if and only
if z 2 Co(L). One should follow the steps taken similarly in the proof of part (a): it
su¢ces to replace L by L0 and R1 by R2, and to apply the identities (*)-(****).
(c) Finally, let C be explicable by an extension R+ = (M+;#) of R with CAUR+ =
CAUR. Let K 2 D3 and x 2 K. We prove x 2 CR3(K) , x 2 C(K). Since K 2 D3,
we can pick L;L0 2 Ko such that P(L) \ CAUR = P(K) \ CAUR, M3K =M3L, and (+)
KR3 = (L0)R3 . Since CAUR+ = CAUR and P(L) \ CAUR = P(K) \ CAUR, we have
P(L) \ CAUR+ = P(K) \ CAUR+ , and thus, by Proposition 2, M+L = M+K . By (+),
there is a z 2 L0 such that (++) xR3K = zR
3
L0 . Since M
+
L0 =M
3
L0 (=ML0), we have
(L0)R
+
= (L0)R
3
and zR
+
L0 = z
R3
L0 : (8)
Since M+L =M
3
L (=ML), M
+
L =M
+
K , and M
3
L =M
3
K , we have M
+
K =M
3
K , and thus
KR
+
= KR
3
and xR
+
K = x
R3
K : (9)
By (+), (++), (8), and (9), we have (+++) KR+ = (L0)R+ and (++++) xR+K = z
R+
L0 . The
claimed equivalence can once again be proved by establishing that each side holds if and
only if z 2 Co(L); one should use the same argument as for part (a), replacing L by L0
and R1 by R3, and drawing on the identities (+)-(++++). !
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